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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE SINEWS OF WAR: 
TURKEY, CHROMITE, AND THE  
SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
 
Ranck, Aaron 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
October 2008 
 
 This thesis is an historical narrative examining the role of Turkish trade in 
chromite ore during the Second World War.  It primarily seeks to understand how this 
trade impacted Turkey’s status as a neutral power while also looking at how this trade 
affected Turkish-American relations.   
 In addition to a survey of the secondary literature, substantial amounts of primary 
source documents in the US National Archives from the US Departments of State and 
Interior as well as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were used.   
 This thesis argues that Turkish statesmen successfully used trade in chromite as a 
bargaining tool to maintain Turkish neutrality throughout the war.  It also argues that 
British and American efforts to monopolize chromite trade and block German access to 
the ore largely failed. 
Key Words: Turkey, United States, Chromite Deposits 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
SAVAŞIN ENSTRÜMANLARI: 
TÜRKİYE, KROMİT VE İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI 
 
 
Ranck, Aaron 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Ekim 2008 
 
 Bu tez, Türkiye’nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasındaki rolünü inceleyen bir tarih 
anlatısıdır.  Tezin başlıca amacı, bu ticaretin tarafsız bir güç olarak Türkiye’nin statüsünü 
ve bu arada Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğini anlamaya çalışmaktır.   
 Yardımcı literatürün yanı sıra, Amerikan Dışişleri ve İçişleri Bakanlıkları ve 
Stratejik Hizmetler Dairesinde (OSS) bulunan Amerikan Ulusal Arşivlerindeki ciddi 
sayıda kaynak doküman da incelenmiştir.   
 Bu tez, Türk devlet adamlarının savaş süresince Türkiye’nin tarafsızlığını 
korumak amacıyla kromiti başarılı bir biçimde bir pazarlık aracı olarak kullandıklarını 
savunmaktadır.  İngiliz ve Amerikalıların kromit ticaretini tekelleştirilmesi ve Almanların 
bu madene ulaşmalarını engelleme yönündeki çabalarının büyük oranda başarısızlıkla 
sonuçlandığı tezi de ayrıca ele alınmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Birleşik Devletler, Kromit Yatakları 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WHY CHROMITE? 
 
 
Chromium is to modern industry as yeast is to bread; 
only a little is required, but without it there is no bread. 
 
Arthur Kemp (1942)    
 
 
 This thesis is an analysis of how the Turkish government used chromite as a 
bargaining tool to maintain its sovereignty and stay out of the Second World War.  
During the lead-up to the war Turkish diplomats sought out treaties and agreements to 
preserve Turkish sovereignty.  Initially, Turkey turned to Britain and France in the face of 
Italian threats of aggression in the Mediterranean, but Turkish statesmen also sought 
agreement with the USSR, the United States, and the smaller states of Southeastern 
Europe and the Near East.  However, as the war developed and Germany became the 
greatest threat to Turkish sovereignty, Turkish statesmen increasingly sought 
accommodation with the aggressive German behemoth, frustrating the Allies but not to 
the point of seriously damaging relations.  When Allied forces began winning major 
victories and reversing Germany’s territorial gains, Turkish leaders again recalibrated 
their position and as the war came to a conclusion, Turkey broke off all political and 
economic ties with Germany. 
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 At the center of Turkish negotiations between Axis and Allied lay Turkish trade 
and no item produced in Turkey was of more strategic import at this time than chromite.    
Since all of the major powers except the Soviet Union lacked substantial domestic 
supplies, and given Turkey’s large and production of high-quality chromite, Turkey was 
at the center of Axis and Allied ambitions for chromite.  A misstep on the part of the 
Turks could have meant an affront to Turkish sovereignty from Axis or Allied powers, or 
worst of all, could have made Turkey a battleground between the two sides.   
 This thesis’ central question revolves around chromite and its role in keeping 
Turkey out of the war.  Just how important was chromite to Turkey’s effort to stay out of 
the war?  Furthermore, the paper seeks to address the economic and political situation in 
both the United States and Turkey on the eve of the war in order to demonstrate the role 
the countries would play during the war.  On the issue of chromite in particular, an effort 
is also made to sketch the importance of minerals in general to modern warfare and why 
chromite in particular was so important.   
Turkey was fortunate to have a gifted coterie of statesmen who navigated the 
Turkish state between the Scylla of the Axis and the Charybdis of the Allies.  This paper 
argues that Turkey’s foreign policy during the Second World War, and particularly on the 
issue of chromite, was a marked success because Turkish leaders balanced the competing 
interests of Axis and Allied powers and, critically, kept their country out of the war and 
safe from the ruin that fell upon much of Europe and Asia.  These conclusions to the 
central questions of this paper largely conform to what has already been published by 
historians. 
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 In order to answer the investigate the main questions this paper did not only rely 
upon the secondary literature but used a variety of primary sources, particularly US 
Department of State records found in the Foreign Relations of the United States, State 
Department Central File records stored both in the American Embassy, Ankara, and at 
the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.  This paper also utilizes several 
documents from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), also stored at the National Archives.  The OSS opened an 
office in Istanbul in 1943 and took an active interest in investigating Turkey’s chromite 
supply, shipments, and the backdoor dealings related to its movements.  Much of the data 
in this thesis derives from OSS reports. 
This paper also uses United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines 
documents that outline in great detail worldwide mineral production and trade.  Lastly, 
period newspaper, magazine, and journal articles provide an important contemporary 
view of how the public saw chromite’s import to the war.  
What exactly are chromium and chromite?  Chromium is an alloy derived from 
chromite ore and is vital in the strengthening and coating of steel.  During the late 1930s 
Turkey contained some of the world’s largest known stocks of chromite ore.  In the 1930s 
chromite, Arthur Kemp writes, was in the “rarer one-third of the elements, which together 
comprise[d] only .05% of the earth’s surface.”  He continued: 
Certain properties make it extremely useful both for consumption goods and for 
industrial purposes: (1) it takes a very high luster and polish; and (2) its alloys are 
very tough and resistant to corrosion from atmosphere, sea water, molten zinc, tin, 
and brass, sulphur compounds, ammonia, and other organic acids.1
                                                 
1 Arthur Kemp, “Chromium: A Strategic Material.” Harvard Business Review (Winter 1942), 200. 
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Chromium is an alloy that comes from chromite and chromium is rarely found in 
its pure form.2  Chromium’s special qualities give it a very broad range of use, from 
everyday household items like the rust-preventive coatings on spoons, knives, and forks 
in every household kitchen to uses in “crusher parts, cutting tools, excavating machinery, 
fuselages, precision instruments, bearings, gears, and chemical equipment.”3  Given its 
importance to steel production, “[i]n warfare, chromium is synonymous with 
armaments.”4 It is used in the production of everything from tanks, ships, U-boats, and 
virtually all varieties of shells and armaments.  In other words, “Chromium is to modern 
industry as yeast is to bread; only a little is required, but without it there is no bread.”5
Napoleon found that an army travels on it stomach, but in today’s battles supplies 
of food for men, though still important, are not so vital as supplies for field guns, 
tanks, and other mobile but inanimate equipment.  Whereas hungry soldiers can 
tighten their belts and keep on fighting for hours, machine guns without bullets 
must cease firing and trucks and planes stop the moment their fuel is gone.
  If 
bread was essential to the pre-modern army, minerals took their place as the stuff of war.   
6
 Revolutionary change is frequently only possible in the wake of calamitous 
disaster.  For Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the National Movement, the Ottoman 
Empire’s defeat in World War I (save Mustafa Kemal’s fame-making leadership in the 
   
 
Lastly, a few previously unpublished documents from the archives of the Office of 
Strategic Services shed additional light on the development of the strategic relationship 
between the United States and Turkey over this important ore. 
 
1.1 From Independence to a Tri-Partite Agreement 
                                                 
2 Kemp, 200. 
3 Kemp, 200. 
4 Kemp, 200. 
5 Kemp, 199. 
6 Paul Tyler, “Minerals and War” Harvard Business Review (Autumn 1940), 1. 
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defense of Gallipoli in 1915 and Halil Pasha’s victory over the British in Kut al-Amara in 
1917) and the terms dictated upon the Empire by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) were simply 
unacceptable.  Mustafa Kemal and other officers within the Ottoman military refused to 
stand by while the Ottoman Empire was carved into pieces by the victors, leaving only a 
small rump state in north-central Anatolia, so they mounted an armed defense of the 
Anatolian heartland.  The Nationalists adopted one of the last Ottoman Parliament’s final 
acts, the National Pact (Appendix 1) as a constitution of sorts and set out to repel the 
threat of foreign invasion.   
 Through a series of military victories over invading Greek armies and pressure on 
the occupiers of Istanbul, the National Movement managed to consolidate control over 
much of Anatolia.  The new government in Ankara defeated Armenian forces in the east 
and established its border with the Soviet Union after that country had taken over the 
territory of modern day Azerbaijan and Armenia.  After defeating the Greek forces in 
Izmir in 1922, the National armies turned north in a bid to pressure the Allied powers in 
Istanbul and to force the Greek armies out of Thrace.  When they arrived at the 
Dardanelles they encountered a small British force; after a great deal of tension and the 
threat of fighting, the parties reached an agreement and an armistice was signed.  The 
Nationalists promised to demilitarize the Straits and to not enter Istanbul in exchange for 
Greek forces withdrawing to beyond the Maritza River in Thrace, the modern-day border 
between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria.   
 The Nationalist forces tried on several previous occasions to broker an agreement 
with the Allied powers to revise the Treaty of Sèvres but could never get all the parties 
concerned, particularly Greece, to agree to terms to begin negotiations.  With fresh 
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battlefield victories, however, the Allied powers had little option but to sit down and 
reach an agreement with the Nationalists.  The Nationalists at first insisted on holding the 
conference in Izmir but the Allied powers refused to negotiate on Turkish soil.  The two 
sides eventually compromised on the Swiss city of Lausanne. 
 The Turkish goals for the Lausanne conference were fairly straightforward.  They 
sought to gain international recognition for their sovereignty in Anatolia, abolish the 
capitulations,7
The Entente…saw themselves as the victors of the First World War.  In their eyes 
the conference was meant to adjust the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres to the new 
situation.  In the eyes of the Turks, they themselves were the victors in their 
national independence war and Sèvres for them was past history.
 and establish borders for the nascent country.  In short, they wanted to 
make their de facto control of Anatolia de jure. 
 The negotiations at Lausanne proceeded slowly because, while the Allied powers 
sought to maximize their victory in the war and gain territory and influence, it was clear 
to all parties sitting around the conference table that the Allied powers would be 
unwilling to back most of their claims by force.  This did not mean, however, that the 
Allied powers gave way easily and quickly.  In spite of the Nationalists position of 
strength, it took several months and a lot of hard bargaining for the two sides to reach 
compromise on the main issues.  Erik Zürcher writes that the two sides struggled to come 
to terms because they approached the negotiations from substantially different 
perspectives:   
8
                                                 
7 The capitulations were special rights and privileges granted by the Ottoman government to foreign 
merchants.  These rights allowed individuals holding foreign passports to operate subject to the laws of the 
country from which they held a passport instead of according to Ottoman law.  Over time the system was 
frequently abused and became a source of major irritation to successive Ottoman governments.  When the 
Nationalists came to power and pledged to establish a secular state based on secular law where people of all 
religious faiths would be subject to the same laws, the foreign powers lost the force behind their arguments 
for a continuation of this system. 
8 Erik Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 161. 
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The sides did eventually compromise and the agreement they reached defined 
most of the borders for the modern state of Turkey, with two notable exceptions.  
Compromise could not be reached on the status of the provinces of Mosul and 
Alexandretta (Hatay) and so they were both tabled.    
The United States took a backseat role in the Lausanne Conference, partly 
because the United States and the Ottoman Empire had never declared war upon each 
other and therefore need not make peace, but also because of fear among State 
Department officials that American popular sympathy over the plight of the Armenians 
would force the US representatives at Lausanne to play the role of advocates for the 
Armenians, overshadowing concerns about protecting American interests in Turkey and 
making the establishment of formal relations with the new government even more 
difficult.  It should be noted that the current debate in the United States over how the US 
Government should interact with the Turkish government as a result of successive 
Turkish governments’ culpability in the Armenian massacres is not a new one.  A Time 
article from 1923 reports:  
In addition to the criticism in the British Commons and in the French Chamber of 
Deputies, the Lausanne Treaty came under heavy fire in the U.S.  In a three-hours 
discussion at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Manhattan, James W. Gerard, former 
U.S. Ambassador to Germany, attacked the [Lausanne] Treaty, contending that 
‘Christian civilization was crucified at Lausanne and the Stars and Stripes were 
trailed in the mire in the interest of a group of oil speculators.’ [Clearly cynical 
remarks about American foreign policy and oil are not new, either] He 
characterized the Turks as murderers and the Kemalist government as a group of 
adventurers whose regime was on its last legs.  His position received needed 
dignity from the support of Professor A.D.F. Hamlin of Columbia University and 
Prof. Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard, who wrote a letter saying that the Treaty 
was worthless and the Turks untrustworthy.  Feelings ran so high that blows 
impended on several occasions when the Turks and their Treaty were defended by 
Prof. Edward Meade Earle of Columbia, Dr. James J. Barton, Secretary of the 
Foreign Department of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
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Missions, and the Rev. Albert W. Staub, American Director of Near East 
colleges.9
The obstacles were formidable.  While the Treaty of Lausanne gave international 
recognition to the new Turkish state it could not help Turkey escape from its dire 
situation.  Zürcher notes, “After ten years of almost continues warfare it [Turkey] was 
depopulated, impoverished, and in ruins to a degree almost unparalleled in modern 
history.”
 
 
Viewed from Ankara, however, the Treaty of Lausanne became an important 
turning point in Turkish foreign policy.  Mostly secure within the newly delineated 
borders, Turkish foreign policy now moved from its period of maximization and 
uncertainty to conservatism and anti-revisionism.  In other words, while first Italy 
(1920s) and then Germany (1930s) were becoming increasingly irredentist, Turkish 
politicians were keenly aware of the limitations on their movement. Anatolia was diverse 
to begin with, including large populations of self-identifying Turks in central Anatolia 
and large populations of Kurds in the east.  For Turkey to hope to regain much more of 
the lost Ottoman territory would mean the incorporation of large populations of non-
Turkic speaking peoples who would have been difficult to  integrate into a Turkish 
national state.  Furthermore, Turkish leaders also understood the limitations of their 
military capabilities and had little interest in engaging the Soviet Union in the northeast 
or pushing the British to war over the province of Mosul.  After Lausanne, therefore, 
Turkish leaders looked inward for ways to transform society and state in order to build 
the Turkish state into a wealthy, industrial, and secure modern state. 
10
                                                 
9 “Lausanne Treaty,” Time, 14 April 1924, < 
   
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,718168-
1,00.html> (19 September 2008). 
10 Zürcher, p. 163. 
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In addition to the internal economic and social reforms, Turkey also set out to 
sign a number of treaties of friendship in order to secure its borders against revisionist 
countries and provide insurance against irredentist states, too.  Turkish-Soviet 
cooperation in eastern Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence led to the 
signing of a Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1921, again in 1925, and to generally 
warm relations between the two states that would last into the 1930s.11  The Soviet Union 
provided $8 million in financial assistance to Turkey for its first five-year 
industrialization plan (1934-9) and the USSR also built several plants in Turkey.12  
Turkey’s secure borders in the east and friendly relationship with the Soviet Union 
provided significant stability to the state in its early years but did not neutralize Turkish 
leaders’ fear of other threats.  As Anthony Eden once remarked, Russia was “a land 
animal”13
                                                 
11 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179. 
12 Deringil, 18. 
13 Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning, (London: Cassell, 1965), 411. 
 and the Soviet Union’s influence in the 1930s did not extend far beyond the 
hemmed in waters of the Black Sea.  Turkish leaders therefore sought out other allies 
with whom they could shore up their naval security in the Aegean and Mediterranean 
seas. 
Turkish fears in the 1930s focused primarily on Italy.  Italy had captured the 
territories of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (modern-day Libya) and also the Dodecanese 
Islands off the southwestern coast of Anatolia from the Ottoman Empire in the Italo-
Turkic war of 1911-1912.  Italy also briefly occupied the city of Antalya in southern 
Anatolia after the First World War.  Turkish officials therefore took Mussolini seriously 
when he spoke longingly of reclaiming the Roman Empire’s Asian provinces.   
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Deep suspicion of Italian motives combined with Turkish suspicions of 
Hungarian, Greek, and Bulgarian motives in the Balkans pushed Turkey’s leaders to seek 
some insurance against a renewed attack on Turkish territory.  Greece, the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and Romania had all gained territory as a result of the First 
World War but Hungary and Bulgaria had revisionist governments as a result of the fact 
that they were on the losing side of the war and had been punished for it.14  Turkey, on 
the other hand, had become a status quo power as a result of the Lausanne Treaty and 
sought an anti-revisionist alliance with the other status quo states in the Balkans.  In 
1934, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania signed a Balkan Pact.  In this agreement 
the states agreed that “in the event of aggression against any of them, they would each 
guarantee the frontiers of the signatory state against the aggressor, and would consult 
with one another in the event of any threat to peace in the region.”15
It is worth noting that Turkey also signed a pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
in 1937, called the Saadabad Pact.  This pact committed the four states to non-aggression 
against one another and to “preserve their common frontiers.”
  While not a 
particularly strong agreement—it only called on the states to consult with one another in 
the face of aggression—it did send a clear signal to the irredentist governments in 
Bulgaria and Hungary. 
16
                                                 
14 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 61. 
15 Hale, p. 61. 
16 Hale, p. 62. 
  This translated not as 
mutual assurance against a potential European or Mediterranean aggressor but rather 
helped stabilize the border frontier between Turkey and Iran, a border fraught with 
Kurdish rebel activity.  The pact stated the signatory countries would honor each other’s 
sovereignty and not tolerate armed militants within their borders.  The pact was therefore 
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one more step in the direction of making permanent Turkey’s borders with its neighbors 
and improving the state’s sovereign control over its territory. 
Returning west for a moment, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935) and Hitler’s 
violations of the Treaty of Versailles alarmed the Turkish government.  In the mid to late 
1930s Turkey therefore approached the naval powers of Britain and France to improve its 
security in the Mediterranean, hoping to ultimately bring these two states together into a 
potential pact with the Soviet Union (this relationship was for security in the Black Sea) 
to provide significant security against Italy and any other revisionist state that might 
challenge the status quo.  Britain and France remained reluctant to sign a pact with 
Turkey, however, particularly because of continued disagreement between Turkey and 
France over the sanjak of Alexandretta.   
In 1938 Hitler began to move to realize his plans for Central Europe by 
announcing the Anschluss (union) of Austria with Germany and by taking over the 
Sudetenland.  This was followed in 1939 by the Italian invasion of Albania.  These 
moves put substantial pressure on Britain and France—pressure which Turkey duly 
utilized to great effect in its acquisition of Alexandretta from the French Mandate, Syria.  
It also forced the British and French to reconsider their position in the Mediterranean; an 
alliance with Turkey suddenly became much more attractive.   
The United Kingdom, France, and Turkey signed a Tripartite Alliance (Appendix 
2) in 1939.  The treaty pledged French and British aid to Turkey in the event of a 
European power (read: Italy) attack and committed Turkey to lend all of the support it 
could to France and Britain if either of them should be attacked in the Mediterranean.  
The treaty also contained pledges from Britain and France that the treaty did not compel 
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Turkey to go to war with the Soviet Union.  It is critical to note that the treaty did not in 
any way force Turkey to declare war on another state if Britain and France went to war.  
In other words, the treaty contained no automatic “trigger clause” that obliged Turkey to 
declare war on any state merely if Britain and France declared war.  Indeed, quite the 
opposite, Article four, paragraph two of the treaty states that Turkey had the right to 
maintain “a benevolent neutrality,” even if Britain and France were engaged in hostilities 
with another European power.17  Some historians have looked back upon Turkish action 
during the Second World War and have interpreted Turkish leaders’ reluctance to bring 
Turkey into the war as a violation of this treaty, or at least bad faith on the part of Turkish 
leaders.18
 Turkey spent the period between the first and second world wars consolidating the 
gains it had made from the national movement and worked to create a modern Republic 
from the foundations of the Ottoman Empire.  The country successfully avoided major 
conflicts with its neighbors and renounced territorial ambitions on almost all of its former 
lands, including most of the Arab and Balkans lands.
  This study will provide evidence in a later section demonstrating why this is an 
inaccurate reading of the historical sources. 
 
1.2 The Turkish Economy in the 1930s 
19
                                                 
17 Number 4689 – A Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and 
Turkey.  Signed at Angora, October 19h, 1939. (A Traduction/Translation from the French). ONLINE. 
November 16, 1939. United Nations Treaty Collection. Available: 
  Turkish leaders had succeeded in 
establishing a modern republic with full diplomatic recognition by all of the major 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/19/35/00037738.pdf. [August, 2007] p. 3. 
18 See in particular, Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral. (Columbia: University of Missouri:, MO, 1979). 
and Karl Heinz Roth, “Berlin-Ankara-Baghdad: Franz von Papen and German Near East Policy during the 
Second World War” in Germany and the Middle East: 1871-1945, Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ed. (Princeton: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004). 
19 Two important exceptions here were the the Mosul region of northern Iraq and the sanjak (district) of 
Hatay, though both of these issues had been resolved by 1926 and 1939 respectively.  
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powers and had consolidated control over the strategically vital Dardanelles and 
Bosporus straits by 1936.   
In spite of all of these gains Turkey remained relatively weak compared to the 
larger European states on the eve of the Second World War.  European states regained 
their economic strength and industrial base, whereas the Turkish economy remained 
largely agricultural.  As the decade of the 1930s began to come to a close, Turkey 
therefore found itself in a precarious position between the far greater industrial and 
military might of the saber-rattling Germans, and the combination of a strengthened and 
emboldened Soviet Union, an irredentist Italy, and a British state that sought to maintain 
its naval primacy and protect its imperial route to India via the Mediterranean, Red Sea, 
Persian Gulf, and beyond. 
 The disparity in size between the Turkish economy and its European neighbors is 
but one factor in its relationship with those states.  Trade is another important lens with 
which to examine Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the various belligerents of the Second 
World War because trade can act as a mitigating factor against relative inequality.  When 
larger and more powerful states do not possess certain material domestically, this can 
give even small states great leverage. 
Turkey in the late 1930s was a medium-sized state situated in a strategically vital 
location.  The country’s population consisted of nearly 18 million people, about 70 
percent of whom worked in the agricultural sector.  A full 91 percent of Turkish exports 
between 1935 and 1945 were agricultural products and accounted for 70 percent of 
national revenues.  In the early 1930s Turkey exported a relatively small amount of its 
products to Germany.  For example, in 1931 about 10 percent of Turkey’s exports went 
14 
 
to Germany while roughly 20 percent of Turkey’s imports came from Germany.  Only 
five years later, 51 percent of Turkey’s exports went to Germany and 45 percent of the 
country’s total imports came from Germany.  In the same year, 1936, about 10 percent of 
Turkish imports came from Britain and 11 percent from the United States.20
 Turkish exports and imports with Germany surged in the early 1930s as a result of 
a new trading scheme in Germany.  In early 1934 Hjalmar Schacht became the new head 
of the German Ministry of Economics and one of his first acts was to institute a new 
economic plan that included a “process of payment through accounts.”  In the words of 
Schacht, “Foreign countries selling goods to us [Germany] would have the amount of our 
purchases credited to their account in German currency and with this they could then buy 
anything they wanted in Germany.”
  
21  This seemed to provide advantages to both 
Germany and the countries with which it sought to trade because the plan “obviated the 
necessity of using scarce foreign exchange currencies to purchase commodities 
abroad;”22 this was a boon to Germany and the various other currency-strapped countries 
experiencing high inflationary rates in the Great Depression.  In practice this system 
enabled Turkey to import manufactured goods, such as “constructional steel, finished 
copper, vehicles and engines of all kinds, heavy machinery, tires and other rubber 
products, glass, newsprint, and pharmaceuticals”23 in exchange for its raw products, such 
as hazelnuts, olive oil, leather, mohair, chromite, and various other commodities.24
                                                 
20 Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power 
Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 96. 
21 Weisband, pp. 98-99. 
22 Weisband, p. 99. 
23 Weisband, 96 
24 Wilbur Keblinger, American Consul General in Hamburg, Report No. 139, Voluntary Report for State 
Dep. Division of Trade Agreements, Washington, DC, Sept. 14, 1937; State Department Central Files, 
Record Group 69, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD. 
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The highly centralized and state-controlled nature of the Turkish economy also 
helps to explain how the country’s trade relationship changed so quickly.  Turkey’s 
particular version of state-centered economic policies, or etatism,25 had its antecedents in 
the authoritarianism of the Republic’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, but the term is 
especially applied to the state policies enacted during the 1930s.  These policies were 
attempts by the state to counter the severe impact of the global economic depression on 
the Turkish economy.  This global slowdown caused a significant drop in the national 
income in Turkey and compelled the government to respond.  Its response was an 
increase of state control and direction of the economy, formally spelled out as etatism by 
President Mustafa Kemal in a speech on 27 January 1931.26
Turkish-German trade in the 1930s conformed to the general pattern of trade 
between industrialized and agrarian countries at this time and also fit the regional pattern 
of trade between Germany and the other largely agrarian and non-industrialized countries 
of southeastern Europe.  Germany required large amounts of raw materials that it did not 
  This policy, combined with 
the Schacht plan in Germany, explains Turkey’s rather dramatic shift away from trade 
with the western European states (and the US) in the 1920s to a greater interdependence 
between Turkey and Germany in the 1930s. 
                                                 
25 Historians of Turkey typically use the term “etatism” to explain Turkish (and sometimes late Ottoman) 
economic policies.  Etatism essentially means state-centered economic policies; it is also sometimes 
rendered “statism.”  While the difference between etatism and socialism is not always clear, etatism is 
typically used to distinguish Turkish policy from the more drastic and far-reaching measures implemented 
by the Bolsheviks in Russia and by other socialist revolutions around the world.  Dilek Barlas uses the 
definition of “etatism” found in A Dictionary of Political Thought: “Etatism was initially used in France by 
liberals in 1890 as a doctrine defended by protectionists and socialists for the omnipotence and interference 
of the state in economic and social affairs.  In the 1920s, it was defined by French writers as the direct 
intervention by the state in the economic life of a capitalist society, by nationalization, by the 
administration of prices, and control of wages, and by social welfare legislation.” From Dilek Barlas, 
Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-
1939. The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy 14., eds. Suraiya Faroqui and 
Halil Inalcık. (Leiden: Brill, 1998), xi. 
26 Barlas, 62. 
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possess domestically, such as petroleum, rubber, aluminum, tin, and chromite to feed its 
industrial production whereas the industrializing states of southeastern Europe sought 
finished products such as trains, tanks, automobiles, and airplanes from the industrial 
countries. 
The Turkish shift in trade did not go unnoticed.  Successive United States 
Ambassadors to Turkey expressed alarm over this shift away from the purchase of 
American goods.  Ambassador Robert Skinner wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 
1934, “The general facts are that while we continue to purchase Turkish goods, especially 
tobacco, more or less as we have in the past, Turkish importations from the United States 
show a constant and alarming decrease.”27
The Ambassadors’ concerns, however, were not shared by everyone in 
Washington.  Skinner’s detractors argued that the United States must abide by its belief 
in the principle of free trade and therefore avoid engaging in preferential clearing 
agreements, such as the Turkish-German clearing agreement, because while agreements 
  Skinner knew that some people reading his 
memoranda back in Washington would think, “So what?  If Turkish companies want to 
purchase goods from European instead of American companies because the Americans 
do not offer good enough terms, that is of no concern to the US government.”  He 
therefore emphasized that the Turkish government played the primary role in directing 
purchases.  Skinner mentions that some of his Turkish colleagues did try to argue that 
they could not do anything because if Turkish companies sought to buy products in 
Germany instead of America, well, that’s the free market at work and the government 
could not stop them.   
                                                 
27 FRUS, 1934, vol. 2, Ambassador to Turkey Robert Skinner to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, “Proposals 
for Improving Unsatisfactory Trade Relations with Turkey,” Washington, DC, 1951, pp. 940-942. 
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of this type may lead to greater bilateral trade they actually decrease multilateral trade.  
Wallace Murray, the head of the Near Eastern desk at the State Department, argued as 
much in a memo to Skinner dated June 7, 1934.28
But Ambassador Skinner would not be deterred.  Six months after the above-
mentioned exchange of memoranda, Skinner wrote again to ask if there was not more that 
he and the United States could do to improve the balance of trade.  Tiring of his 
incorrigible prodding, Murray rebuked him again, reminding him that the US was not 
interested in clearing agreements because they go against the very foundation of 
American economic policy: free trade.
  Murray also pointed out that Turkish-
American trade made up only a small part of American trade and therefore mattered little 
on a global scale. 
29
                                                 
28 FRUS, 1934, vol. 2, A memorandum from the Chief of the Division of  Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace 
Murray, to the Ambassador in Turkey, Robert Skinner. Washington, DC, 1951, pp. 948-949. 
29 FRUS, 1935, vol. 1, A memo from the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray, to 
the Ambassador in Turkey, Robert Skinner. Washington, DC, 1953, pp. 1043-1044. 
   
Murray also covered his bases.  Perhaps worried that the Ambassador would try to 
go over his head, Murray sent a memo to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had 
previously expressed sympathy with the Ambassador’s views.  In order to bolster his 
argument, Murray borrowed heavily from a strongly-worded memo the US Commercial 
Attaché in Istanbul, Julian Gillespie, had recently sent to Ambassador Skinner.  In the 
memo the attaché took issue with the Ambassador’s belief that “Turkey should buy from 
those who bought from her.”  He argued that this concept and economic nationalism in 
general, such as “Buy British” or “Buy American” sound appealing but are in fact 
economically unsound because they lead to trade isolation and tend to decrease overall 
trade.  To illustrate his point, the attaché sketched out a hypothetical scenario: 
18 
 
I feel that trade between nations can be compared to commercial transactions 
between individuals.  The idea and principle seems to me to be the same except 
that trade relations between nations is simply commercial transactions between 
individuals multiplied by a million, or two million or 100 million.  If I was a 
butcher I do not see why I should be expected to buy my clothes from a tailor 
rather than from a department store simply because the tailor bought more meat 
from me than the owner of the department store, nor why if I was a butcher, I 
should call in a doctor or a dentist in whom I had no confidence simply because 
that particular doctor or dentist purchased my stakes or chops.  It seems to me that 
this idea or principle of ‘buy from those who bought from you’ not only tends 
toward trade isolation but that it will actually prevent an increase in international 
trade, and will only result in the diversion of purchases from one country to 
another country and that in the final analysis trade relations will remain static, if 
not actually decrease.30
                                                 
30 FRUS, 1935, vol. 1, The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Wallace Murray, to Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, Washington, DC, 1953, pp. 1044-1046. 
 
 
If the above argument was not enough to persuade the Ambassador, the attaché 
also reminded him that Turkey’s total import-export trade amounted to only a small 
percentage of world trade, less than one percent, and the US share in Turkish trade was 
extremely small.  Furthermore, the United States enjoyed a favorable balance of trade 
with states such as Canada, the UK, Japan, and Germany and that if the United States 
made a public issue of its unfavorable trade balance with Turkey it risked handing the 
same argument to these far more important economic partners.  Ambassador Skinner 
appears to have been won over by these arguments for thereafter the record goes silent. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE U.S.A. ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II 
 
 
2.1 American Foreign Policy before World War II 
With the above sketch of the Turkish economic and political situation on the eve 
of the Second World War, it would be helpful to examine the United States in a similar 
way during the same period.  One of the great enigmas of defining American foreign 
policy in the 1930s is the gulf between Americans’ public perception of the United States 
in the world and the economic reality of America and its trade relationship with other 
major powers.  The United States’ spatial distance from the major powers of Europe 
meant that the US rose to power somewhat removed from the internal rivalries that had 
divided European states since even before the Peace of Westphalia.  As the United States 
came to dominate the American continents, European governments generally proved too 
far away to commit to a serious effort to challenge American expansionism, neither 
territorially as the country expanded westward to the Pacific Ocean nor did the European 
states manage to stem the American hegemonic tide southward as the US gained 
influence in Central and South America and the Caribbean.   
The rise of industrialism in America combined with its population and territorial 
growth meant that a new great power had arisen off the European continent but until the 
20 
 
early part of the 20th century the United States remained largely concerned with securing 
and consolidating its position in the Americas.31
America’s transformation into an international Great Power may have made a 
large step forward in the First World War but not all of the American political institutions 
were ready for such a new role.  The American Senate, reflecting an inward-looking 
populace that was suspicious of foreign power and great power politics, placed a serious 
check on Wilson’s foreign policy idealism by rejecting America’s entry into the League 
of Nations.  Wilson’s liberal world view and new role for America was not something 
that resonated with the broader populace.  As Richard Overy writes, “For all the 
attractions of Wilson’s brand of liberal internationalism, it was a view of the world 
shared by only a small section of American society, predominantly among the East Coast 
elites where Wilson found his greatest support.”
  American intervention in the First 
World War was therefore a significant change of course.  For the first time the United 
States found itself committing large numbers of troops to a European conflict and with 
the conclusion of the conflict the United States now found itself in the position of trying 
to determine what role it would continue to play in European and global affairs.  
President Woodrow Wilson had high hopes about American hegemonic influence in the 
world and his foreign policy idealism is well known, particularly from his efforts to set 
up a League of Nations, advocacy of nation-states, and his infamous Fourteen Points.   
32
Several additional elements contributed to American distrust of Europe in the 
1920s.  As the League of Nations charter was being drawn up it became evident that 
European states would dominate it.  For example, the British Commonwealth would 
 
                                                 
31 The American acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War is a 
prominent and notable exception.    
32 Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War, (MacMillan, London, 1989), 260. 
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receive six votes while America would have only one.  Furthermore, many Americans 
viewed with indignation European states that refused to pay back their war debts.  Overy 
comments, “there arose in the 1920s a powerful and enduring sentiment in American 
opinion that Europe was politically decadent and economically untrustworthy.  For all the 
economic ties, an underlying distrust colored relations between Europe and the United 
States for a generation.”33
The Great Depression of the 1930s also allowed isolationist rhetoric to creep into 
the one realm where the United States had been exceedingly internationalist: foreign 
trade.  America’s open door policy took a serious blow when the Congress passed 
legislation raising tariffs on goods coming into the United States in the hope that this 
would protect American industries from foreign competition—in actuality it increased 
trade barriers in America and around the world, thereby exacerbating the problem rather 
than alleviating it.
   
The aftermath of the Wall Street stock market crash of October 29, 1929 
contributed to the American public’s desire to prevent other states’ rivalries from 
intruding on Americans’ sense of “normalcy.”  The drastic psychological impact of the 
stock market crash also helped to push international questions off the front pages of 
American newspapers and keep them removed from everyday concern.  One domestic 
item more than any other therefore dominated American politics in the 1930s: how to pull 
the economy out from under the rubble.   
34
 
  Few Americans at this time believed greater integration between the 
world’s economies would help their own economy recover.  
                                                 
33 Overy, 262. 
34 “A Refresher on the 1930s” The Economist, Print Ed. 17 September 1998, 
<http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TGVSDT> (08 May 2008).  
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2.2. America Goes on Trading While War Breaks Out 
At the outbreak of the Second World War few Americans also believed the 
United States should involve itself with the European conflict.  One Gallup poll stated 
that 94 percent of Americans wanted the US to keep its troops out of Europe.35  President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt echoed this sentiment when he stated in his September 3, 
1939 “Fireside Chat” radio address to the country: “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly 
or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields.”36
With sentiment so strongly opposing the war, even politicians who favored an 
aggressive and interventionist approach found their hands utterly tied by domestic 
opinion.  When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and Hitler began rearming Germany, most 
Americans took note but concluded it was not their concern.  Nor did many Americans 
think the consequences of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria at the beginning of the 
1930s of immediate pressing concern to the security of the United States.  If Japan had 
invaded China prior to the Great Depression it is possible that the “conservative 
internationalists” that dominated American foreign policy making in the 1920s may have 
persuaded the United States government to send troops to defend China; however, not 
even the conservative internationalist-in-chief, President Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of 
State, Henry L. Stimson, could persuade the president and public to lend support to the 
Chinese government in the depression era 1930s.
 
37
                                                 
35 Overy, 258. 
  
36 Matt Dattilo, “The First National Fireside Chat, March 12, 1933,” Matt’s Today in History, comment 
posted March 11, 2008, http://mattstodayinhistory.blogspot.com/2008/03/first-national-fireside-chat-
march-12.html (accessed May 19, 2008). 
37 Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900, Fifth Edition, (New York: Oxford UP, 2002), 149-
151. 
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Another important point which is sometimes overlooked today is the general 
perception of the British Empire by the American public.  Americans in the 1930s were 
strongly anti-imperial and deeply suspicious of the British Empire.  Many Americans also 
believed that it was Britain and France, not Germany, which should be blamed for the 
rising tensions in Europe.38
The debate over Versailles unleashed latent forces of Anglophobia that set the 
stage for recurrent battles in the 1920s and 1930s, and frequently populists and 
western progressives were in the forefront.  The predominantly working-class 
Catholic Knights of Columbus launched a campaign in 1921 to rid the public 
schools of textbooks that the group deemed “pro-British.” Populists of both 
parties denounced Herbert Hoover as an “Englishman” during his nomination as 
Secretary of Commerce and during his 1928 and 1932 presidential 
campaigns.   The colorful Senator Huey P. Long (D-LA) argued that the 
Depression had been manufactured by what he referred to as the “Wall Street-
Downing Street Axis,” while the “radio priest” Father Charles Coughlin called the 
League of Nations the “catspaw of the international bankers of the British 
Empire.”
  The historian John Moser tells us,  
39
Like Turkey the United States may have avoided the war during the initial years 
but as was the case with many other neutral states, it was more than willing to sell goods 
to willing buyers.  However, Americans well-remembered the outcome of the sinking of 
 
 
Moser goes on to explain that the target of this ire was not actually Britain but American 
elites, and the politicians certainly took notice.  Roosevelt carefully positioned himself in 
the early days of the war as a champion of peace who did not particularly favor either 
side in the conflict.  Nonetheless, as the war progressed, American Anglophobia paled in 
comparison to suspicions, frustrations, and outright conflicts of interest with Europe and 
Asia’s irredentist states.    
                                                 
38 Warren F. Kimball, Ed. and Commentator, Roosevelt and Churchill: The Complete Correspondence, Vol. 
I. Alliance Emerging.  (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), 14. 
39 John E. Moser, (2002) “The Decline of American Anglophobia: Or, How Americans Stopped Worrying 
and Learned to Love the English.” Retrieved February 20, 2008 from 
http://personal.ashland.edu/~jmoser1/anglophobia.html  
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the ship Lusitania—an event that had helped usher America into the First World War—
and therefore remained leery of selling to both sides of the European conflict.  With this 
in mind, the Roosevelt Administration developed a “cash and carry” principle for exports.  
In other words, if foreign governments or companies wanted to buy goods from the 
United States they were welcome to do so provided they paid for the goods before 
receiving them and also used their own transportation to get the goods to their 
destinations. Congress passed the necessary legislation and President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt signed it into law on May 1, 1937.40
Two months later Japan expanded its war against China with an attack north of 
Beijing.  Henry Stimson, no longer Secretary of State but still influential in foreign policy 
circles, led a movement to boycott Japanese products.  Still, Roosevelt decided against 
implementing a trade embargo against Japan because of the Depression.
 
41
In the late 1930s and early stages of the Second World War, both the United 
States and Turkey benefited from their spatial distance from the primary belligerents of 
the war.  While both France and Britain were unwillingly drug into the war because they 
could ill afford to remain inactive while Germany annexed more and more territory—
Poland being merely the last straw—Turkey and the United States remained neutral as 
long as they possibly could in order to avoid the enormous cost of war but all the while 
capitalizing on the economic benefits of the war.  The United States would eventually 
have no choice but to join the war after the Pearl Harbor attack (December 7, 1941) and 
  Even after 
Japanese bombers attacked an American gunboat on the Yangtze River in December, 
1937, Roosevelt and the Congress did not believe the United States should go to war. 
                                                 
40 Schulzinger, p. 161. 
41 Schulzinger, p. 162. 
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Hitler’s declaration of war against the United States a few days later; for Turkey, we will 
see that diplomacy, trade, and a crucial decision by Hitler would save the state from 
having to become an active belligerent. 
 
2.3 Minerals and War 
The United States in the mid to late 1930s was preparing for war by greatly 
increasing the size and capacity of its military even while many hoped the United States 
might be able to avoid joining the war; this view is reflected in many other areas of the 
government.  One example is the fact that the Department of the Interior was still 
publishing its annual Minerals Yearbook in the late 1930s for all to see and read.42
Events in 1940 have demonstrated again that in this age of mechanization 
minerals are indeed the sinews of war.  The British have shown that valor can 
  These 
valuable sources on global mineral production did not become confidential until 
Germany began its invasion of nearby territories and the extent of its intentions became 
clearer.   
The Bureau of Mines mineral yearbooks reveal countries’ strengths and 
vulnerabilities and allow military planners the data they needed to create strategies for 
securing vital minerals.  The yearbooks also help show enemies’ vulnerabilities.  One 
example is particularly well-known in the United States War in the Pacific against Japan 
and the efforts of the US to secure supplies of rubber while depriving Japan of the same.  
Crippling the enemy’s ability to produce more armaments could very well win the battle 
off the battlefield.  In the words of the Bureau of Mines: 
                                                 
42 In 1940 the Department of the Interior published two yearbooks, one publicly as in previous years but 
then a second, confidential Minerals Yearbook Review that included additional information deemed critical 
to the defense effort.  Subsequent yearbooks were impounded until the conclusion of the war when they 
were again published openly to the public. 
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offset, to a remarkable extent, the advantages of superior armament and 
munitions; but the experience of Finland, Belgium, Greece, and others has 
revealed the ineffectiveness of heroic men against an avalanche of iron, 
manganese, aluminum, and petroleum utilized in tanks and airplanes, bullets and 
bombs.  It is not surprising, therefore, that in our own defense program major 
emphasis has been placed upon the problems of mineral supply and that in 1940 
the activities of the Bureau of Mines, the Government agency chiefly concerned 
with the mineral industries, were largely directed toward furtherance of defense 
objectives.43
If minerals are the sinews of war then a brief look at the quantity, sources, and 
consumption of the principal minerals being produced in the lead-up to the war helps 
shed light on the relative position of the major powers to one another in addition to 
showing disparities between countries.  The difference between industrialized and 
unindustrialized countries in the prewar years could hardly have been greater.  The eight 
wealthiest countries produced 83 percent of the world’s principal minerals and consumed 
81 percent.  For particular items, such as pig iron, the numbers were even starker.  
Between 1933 and 1935, the eight wealthiest countries consumed 99 percent of the 
world’s pig iron.
 
 
44
                                                 
43 H.D. Keiser, Ed., US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook: Review of 1940. 
<
 (Figure 1)  
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/usbmmyb.html> (15 May 2008), p. iii. 
44 Minerals Yearbook, 1937, p. 100. 
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Figure 145
Territory-rich countries like the Soviet Union and the United States were able to 
find much of the resources they needed from within their vast domains while France and 
Britain were able to tap into the resources of their colonies.  In the event of war, Japan, 
Italy, and Germany were in significantly less-advantageous positions because of their 
reliance upon importation for critical materials and a lack of control over ocean supply 
routes (Figure 2).  The countries of southeastern Europe also possessed large, relatively 
untapped quantities of strategic minerals that would prove critical to Germany’s war 
machine.
 
46
                                                 
45 Minerals Yearbook, 1937, p. 112. 
*The eight leading countries include: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, the USSR, UK, and USA. 
**A long ton is a British ton, which is 2240 pounds whereas a short ton is a U.S. ton and is 2000 pounds.  
A tonne (US: metric ton) is 1000 kilograms. 
   
46 H.H. Hughes, US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook: 1937. 
<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/usbmmyb.html> (15 May 2008), p. 103. 
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Figure 2 
 The above sketch of the mineral situation on the eve of the Second World War 
provides the context for the heart of this thesis: Turkish trade between Axis and Allied 
powers.  As the international situation around Turkey changed during the war, Turkish 
leaders sought out any and all levers available for negotiation.  When it came to trade, 
chromite was one of the few non-agricultural items being exported from Turkey and 
given its critical strategic import to Germany, which possessed no domestic supply, 
chromite frequently rose to the center of negotiations between Turkey, Britain, Germany, 
and during the latter part of the war, the United States.  Figure 3 shows the most 
important sources of chromite production in the prewar period.  Note how many of the 
other major producers aside from Turkey, such as South Africa, Rhodesia, India, Cuba, 
and New Caledonia (Figure 3 does not show it but New Caledonia’s production would 
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dramatically increase during the war, making it one of the largest producers in the world) 
would all be inaccessible markets to Germany after the initiation of hostilities.  As 
Germany thrashed through central Europe, its only sources of chromite became Turkey 
and the various countries of Southeastern Europe and the Balkans.  
 
Figure 347
                                                 
47 Minerals Yearbook, 1937, p. 112. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  World Chromite Production, 1932-38       
          
  1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
          
Australia 99 905 1,744 605 422 466 967 
Brazil    5 2,890 2,980 934 
Bulgaria  170 85 325 270 2,350 1745 
Canada 
(shipments) 71 27 101 1,038 837 3,876   
Cuba  24,154 50,162 48,509 71,086 94,592 40,163 
Cyprus 
(shipments) 1,000  982 1,198 508 1,641 5,667 
Greece 1,555 14,784 30,694 31,984 47,347 52,620 42,464 
India (British) 18,152 15,775 21,922 39,755 50,280 63307 44,858 
Japan 12,492 19,897 27,222 36,309 39,039 63,307   
New Caledonia 69,429 50,072 55,182 55,311 47,832 40,000 52,216 
Norway 409 326 42   176 508 
Phillipine Islands    1,202 11,891 69,856 66,911 
Southern 
Rhodesia 15,692 35,046 72,099 105,913 183,395 275,617 186,019 
Turkey 55,196 75,379 119,844 150,514 163,880 192,508 213,630 
Union of South 
Africa 19,371 34,078 61,357 90,431 175,669 168,629 176,561 
USSR 65,900 109,400 127,400 177,900 217,000 200,000   
USA 157 857 375 523 273 2,358 825 
Yugoslavia 39,141 26,248 47,352 52,367 54,044 59,932 58,470 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TURKEY ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II 
 
 
3.1 Turkish Trade between the Axis and Allied Powers 
 When the Italians attacked Ethiopia in 1935, Turkish leaders took note; when 
Hitler’s soldiers marched into Austria and Czechoslovakia, Turkish leaders scrambled for 
assurances against a German, Italian, or even Soviet assault on Turkish sovereignty.  
Turkey’s foreign policy leaders quickly developed a multi-strain plan.  Turkey would 
announce its neutrality in the European conflicts while remaining diplomatically 
amicable toward the Axis and Allied alike; they would simultaneously seek to reduce the 
country’s economic dependence on Germany.   
 As noted earlier, Turkey relied to a great extent on its import-export trade with 
Germany.  Then Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu, worried that this put Turkey in a 
dangerous position.  On December 14, 1939, he said, 
     There is still another truth which requires that, in order that a country may 
have an independent national policy, the greater part of its foreign trade must not 
be directed towards a single country.  To however small an extent foreign trade 
becomes the monopoly of a single country, it is very difficult to pursue an 
independent national policy, even if this country should be an ally.  When 
national policy, the aim of which is independence, and national trade, the object 
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of which is profit, can no longer go side by side, national trade must make a 
sacrifice.48
Saracoğlu and the Turkish government had in fact been trying to diversify away 
from Germany since March of 1939 when Germany occupied Austria.  The Turkish-
German commercial payments agreement of 1938 expired on August 31, 1939 and 
according to Weisband, “the Turkish Government refused to agree to extend it until 
Turkey’s commercial relationships were defined with Britain and France.”
 
  
49
 Britain and France hoped they could convince Turkey to sever commercial 
relations with Germany entirely but Turkey responded that unless the countries were 
ready to assume the trade Turkey would lose with Germany, Turkey could not promise to 
completely cut off its trade with Germany.
 
50  The Allies were ready to accept continued 
Turkish trade with Germany so long as Turkey agreed to deny Germany any supplies that 
might be critical to its war effort.  Turkey responded that the Germans had made it clear 
they were uninterested in Turkish hazelnuts, mohair, and other products if Turkey were 
not willing to also supply Germany with their most-desired product, chromite.51
At the same time Turkey was negotiating commercial arrangements it was also 
negotiating a defensive agreement with the Allies.  Ankara regarded Italy as its greatest 
threat from 1933 to 1937 but by 1939 Turkey’s concern was shifting to Germany.
 
52
                                                 
48 Weisband, p. 100. 
49 Weisband, p. 101. 
50 Weisband, p. 101. Hale, pp. 66-70. 
51 Weisband, p. 101. 
52 Deringil, p. 7. 
  
Turkey therefore shifted its defensive military positions to Thrace and hoped to purchase 
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large quantities of ships, aircraft, and other armaments to defend Istanbul from a possible 
German assault.53
It was precisely in this area that the Allies were of little help.  The Turkish armed 
forces were in no position to fight a war with Germany, or even Italy for that matter.  In 
1938 Selim Deringil notes that the military was “primarily equipped with World War I 
weapons.”
 
54  In 1940 the Foreign Office noted, “‘The Turkish Army is very short of rifles 
and has asked us to supply 150,000…[t]he fact that we have been unable to meet a large 
number of Turkish requests for equipment has already had an adverse psychological 
effect.’”55
The United States, meanwhile, remained a reclusive power on the far side of the 
Atlantic Ocean.  It was clear to all in Europe that the United States would not be involved 
if hostilities broke out because of German-British disagreement in Poland.  As noted 
earlier, the United States was not an important destination for Turkish (agricultural) 
products at this time but nor was the United States able to supply Turkey with the vital 
weapons it needed to strengthen its military, let alone join a defensive alliance in the 
Mediterranean.  To make matters worse, top officials in the State Department were 
nervous about American companies selling anything to Turkey that could be used by the 
military.  A few years earlier, in 1935, the head of the Near East Desk and the 
Ambassador in Turkey debated whether American companies should be able to sell 
  France and the United Kingdom were rapidly beefing up their forces and 
could ill afford to supply Turkey.  The first priority was improving defenses of the 
homeland and throughout the war British generals in the Middle East would lament the 
dire need to reinforce North African troops as well.   
                                                 
53 Hale, 64. 
54 Deringil, p. 33. 
55 Deringil, p. 33. 
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machine tools, tractors, trucks, and chemicals since they would all likely be used by the 
military and could, under a very strict interpretation of US law, therefore be in violation 
of US weapons export bans.  While American diplomats quibbled over such innocuous 
items as machine tools and trucks, Turkish leaders would have to rely upon either Britain, 
or France to supply them with the weapons they needed. 
On October 4, 1940 Secretary Eden sent a memo to the British Cabinet setting 
forth Britain’s predicament in the Middle East.  He argued that British forces were 
“already inferior to the Italian forces opposed to them” and that “in the event of strong 
German air reinforcements reaching that area, the whole of our position in the Middle 
East would be imperilled.” Eden continued that if Greece or Turkey would be attacked, 
“it is of vital importance that we should be able to afford some assistance to these 
countries in the air as well as at sea.”  He then came to the sober conclusion, “our 
strength in the Middle East may very well determine the attitude of both of these 
countries.”56
 Turkey’s brilliant statesman, founder, and strategist, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
passed away in November 1938 and İsmet İnönü took his place as president in a smooth 
transition to power that saw no noticeable change in foreign policy orientation.  İnönü 
believed that Turkey’s defense would be best secured through a defensive alliance with 
Britain and France but he also believed that “the defence of the Balkans rested on 
  Indeed, Britain’s strength in the region was certainly one of, if not the most 
important factor in Turkish policy-makers strategic plans.  Britain and France, it was 
decided back in 1939, would provide a good counterweight for Turkey to Italian ambition 
in the Mediterranean.  However, recognizing the limitations on British land power, 
Turkish leaders looked to their on-again off-again foe to the north, the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
56 Eden, Memoirs, p. 143. 
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cooperation with the Soviet Union.”57  The Soviets saw otherwise, however, and nothing 
came of Turkish efforts to negotiate a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union.  Britain 
also turned down the Turkish offer of a mutual defense alliance in March, 1939.  Two 
weeks later Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and Italy invaded Albania and in August the 
Soviets and Germans would ink the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.  This sudden change in the 
European system of alliances demolished any hope Prime Minister Chamberlain and the 
rest of the world had that Germany could be placated with land settlements.  The British 
now sought to build up as formidable a block against the Germans.  The British informed 
the Turkish Ambassador in London that they were ready to sign a treaty of mutual 
assistance.58
 The first priority for the Turkish Foreign Ministry was to secure an agreement 
with the British and French, while also milking as much out of them as possible.  Turkish 
negotiators recognized that with the looming threat of war, Britain and France 
desperately sought to bolster their alliances and were therefore in a weak negotiating 
position.  The British Ambassador to Turkey called this the Turks “bazaar instincts” but 
no matter what one calls it, the strategy worked.
   
59
                                                 
57 Hale, p. 65. 
58 Hale, p. 66. 
59 Deringil, p. 83. 
  After months of negotiations the 
negotiators secured for Turkey a £25,000,000 credit for war materials, a gold loan of 
£16,000,000 and a loan of £3,500,000 for the transfer of Turkish credits.  In a further 
recognition of France’s weak negotiating position, Turkish leaders took the opportunity 
to wrench control of the strategic region of Hatay away from the French and, lastly, 
brought France into the Turkish-British Treaty of Mutual Assistance (hereafter it will be 
referred to as the Tri-Partite Alliance), signed in Ankara between the three parties on 19 
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October 1939.60  As a sidenote, William Hale writes that one account of the treaty 
negotiations says that Turkey attempted to persuade France and Britain to enter into an 
offensive alliance against Italy in the Mediterranean but the British and French did not 
want to start a war with Mussolini at this time and therefore demanded the treaty remain 
defensive in nature.  This would have been a major departure for Turkish foreign policy 
and is therefore a point for further research and explanation.61
     [t]he Embassy has been authoritatively informed that the Turkish Government 
does not propose to negotiate a new general commercial agreement with Germany 
but is prepared to enter into specific transactions of a barter character by which 
Turkey can obtain from Germany goods previously ordered such as locomotives 
and rolling stock in exchange for tobacco, filberts and similar Turkish products 
which would not contribute to Germany’s war economy.”
 
The mood in Washington following the signing of the Tripartite Agreement was 
positive.  On October 24, 1939, only four days after the signing, the American 
Ambassador to Turkey, John Van Antwerp MacMurray, reported back to Washington the 
changing Turkish trade relationships, 
62
MacMurray also told Washington that the Turkish government informed him it would not 
“permit the exportation to Germany of such goods [i.e. goods which would contribute to 
the military strength of the country] unless the transaction would assure to Turkey an 
increase of war potentialities at least equal to that which Germany might derive from the 
   
  
                                                 
60 The treaty is formally called a “Treaty of Mutual Assistance” but for the sake of simplicity I refer to it as 
the Tripartite Agreement or Tripartite Alliance.  The main body of the treaty was signed on 19 October 
1939 but two subsidiary agreements to the treaty detailing specific financial arrangements were not signed 
until a few months later, on 8 January 1940. 
61 Hale, pp. 66-67. 
62 J.V.A MacMurray to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Memorandum No. 1235, “German-Turkish Trade 
Relations since the Outbreak of the War,” Ankara, 24 October 1939; State Department Central Files, 
Record Group 69, File no. 622.6731/112, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, 
MD. 
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transaction.”63  The important word to note here is “unless” because MacMurray was 
careful to mention that Turkey was not promising to cease trade relations with Germany 
altogether.  Indeed, MacMurray states that Turkey would seek imports from Germany for 
the outstanding credits the country still had under its previously negotiated commercial 
agreement and furthermore Turkey would likely seek to export non war-related goods to 
Germany.  However, MacMurray’s source apparently persuaded him into believing that 
Turkey would not resume trade relations with Germany in materials that would “increase 
Germany’s military strength.”  MacMurray continues, “It is not believed that Turkey will 
furnish to Germany supplies considered as contraband by Turkey’s allies.”64
 The agreement was hailed in the American press as a substantial achievement for 
France and Britain, noting that the British were also negotiating two similar agreements 
with Spain and Yugoslavia.  An article in the New York Times pointed out that these 
agreements were no ordinary trade pacts, but specifically designed to prevent Germany 
from obtaining vital supplies.
  While he 
does not explicitly state it, the Ambassador was referring to Turkey’s chromite. 
65
While Turkey was carrying out negotiations with Britain and France it also hoped 
to sign a defensive agreement with its massive northern neighbor, the Soviet Union.  The 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Saracoğlu, arranged to go to Moscow to negotiate a Turco-
Soviet agreement that could, it was hoped, be signed at the same time as the Tri-Partite 
treaty.  There was one major complication, however, and that was the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that bound the USSR and Germany together.  The Turkish 
Foreign Minister thought an agreement might still might be possible so the Foreign 
 
                                                 
63 Above-cited memorandum from MacMurray, p. 2. 
64 Above-cited memorandum from MacMurray, p. 3. 
65 James B. Reston, “New Allied Pacts Block Reich Trade,” New York Times, December 30, 1939, p. 1. 
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Ministry kept at it, exchanging telegrams with its Ambassadors in Moscow, Paris and 
London in the lead-up to Saracoğlu’s trip.  But the Turks were not the only ones sharing 
information.  Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was keeping in close contact 
with his German counterpart, Joachim von Ribbentrop.  The Germans, already frustrated 
with the prospect of an alliance between Turkey, France, and Britain, told their new 
Slavic friends that they saw no need for a Turco-Soviet defensive pact.  The Germans 
argued that if a pact could not be avoided, the Soviets should at least force a change in 
the Turco-British-French treaty, freeing Turkey of the burden to defend Greece and 
Romania in the event of foreign aggression on those states.  On this point the Soviets 
succeeded and Turkey convinced the others to agree to a change in the treaty.66
On the far more sensitive point of revising the Montreaux Convention on the 
Straits—the Soviets wanted a bi-lateral Turco-Soviet agreement that would give the 
Soviet Union substantial power over the freedom of movement of ships through the 
Straits—Turkey rejected this demand out of hand.  Worst of all for Saracoğlu, Molotov 
demanded a German exclusion clause, that is, the Soviet Union would not be obliged to 
come to Turkey’s aid in the event of a German attack.  Selim Deringil tells us, “Saracoğlu 
vehemently declared that such a clause would deprive the pact of its raison d’être.”
   
67
Turkey’s new arrangement with the Allied powers naturally upset Ankara’s 
relations with Germany.  The German Ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, tried to 
prevent the agreement from turning into a formal alliance, but to no avail.
 At 
this point the treaty negotiations broke down for good. 
68
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67 Deringil, p. 86. 
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  Hale tells us, 
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Von Papen’s long-term goal was to convert the German-Italian axis into a 
triangular one, with Turkey as its third point, but to do this he first had to detach 
Turkey from the prospective Anglo-French alliance.  His project failed at the first 
hurdle, since he could not overcome Turkish suspicions of Italy...69
On November 16, 1939, the Turkish Ambassador in London informed the British 
Government that Turkey’s promise not to sell chromite to Germany was 
contingent upon whether Britain purchased Turkish figs, hazel nuts, raisins, and 
tobacco.
 
  
The outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939 coincided with the expiry of 
the Turkish-German clearing agreement and the Turks were in no hurry to renegotiate the 
agreement given the widespread popular distaste for Germany’s aggression against 
Poland but also Turkish fears of dependence upon the German economy and what that 
might mean for the future.   
The interruption of trade with Germany, the largest purchaser of Turkish 
agricultural products and a major destination for Turkish chromite, put the country’s 
economy on shakier ground.  At this point Turkish and British negotiators sat down to 
write a subsidiary agreement to the previously mentioned political Tri-Partite Agreement.  
Of primary interest to the British was acquisition of high-quality Turkish chromite.  Not 
only was Britain interested in purchasing the chromite but it also hoped to completely 
deprive Germany of this source for ore.  Turkish diplomats insisted, however, that if 
Britain wished to purchase its ore then it must make up the difference in the lost 
agricultural commerce with Germany.  Weisband writes,  
70
The British balked because they could not afford to purchase enough goods to 
“eliminate Germany from the Turkish market.”
 
  
71
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  Turkey sent Numan Menemencioğlu to 
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London to negotiate the agreement and he drove a hard bargain.  Even after the British 
said they could not purchase more than chromite, he insisted that the British purchase 2 
million pounds sterling of Turkish farm commodities since, he said, the Germans 
“refused to accept any such goods unless the Turks agreed to sell them chromite.  If the 
British wished to prevent Turkish chromite from going to Germany, then they had to 
provide a market for Turkey’s perishable raw products.”72
 At one point during the negotiations Turkey proposed that Britain purchase 
Turkey’s chromite for 20 years.  The British refused the offer and would later regret their 
decision.  After some more intense negotiations, however, the British and French signed 
the subsidiary commercial agreement to the Tri-Partite Agreement on January 8, 1940 
agreeing to purchase from Turkey a certain amount of dried fruit until the end of the war, 
provided it did not extend beyond the 1942-1943 growing season.  Britain and France 
also agreed to purchase the total Turkish output of chromite until the end of 1942, or 
roughly 250,000 tons.  The British assumed 11/15’s of the output and the French agreed 
to purchase 4/15’s.
   
73
It is important to note that the contract would expire and need to be renogiated at 
the end of 1942.  While counterfactual analysis can be highly problematic, it is safe to say 
  This would not only make up for the loss of German purchases, 
which had averaged about 50,000 tons annually in the preceeding years, but would also 
cover all of the above-ground stocks that had been piling up since Turkey had ceased 
trade with Germany in September of the previous year. 
                                                 
72 Weisband, p. 102. 
73 FRUS, 1940, vol. 3, US Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph P. Kennedy to Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, Washington, DC, 1958, p. 944. 
FRUS, 1923, vol. 2. US Ambassador to Great Britain George Harvey to Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes, Washington, DC, 1938, p. 881. 
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that if the British and French had jumped at the opportunity to lock up Turkish chromite 
exports for the duration of the war when they had the chance, Turkish neutrality would 
have been all that much more perilous and Germany may have even used a Turkish 
refusal to sell chromite to Germany as a casus belli for attacking Turkey.  To be clear, 
there is scant evidence for this in the historical record but given the importance chromite 
took on during the latter part of the war it is worth considering.   
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Figure 474
 With each move Germany made Turkish politicians grew more skeptical of the 
country’s motives; however, while Turkey temporarily cut off much of its trade with 
Germany after the outbreak of hostilities in Poland, it was not interested in completely 
cutting off its commercial relationship unless it could have guarantees from the Allies for 
 
                                                 
74 Data from Enil Sauer, American Consul General, Frankfurt, Voluntary Report No. 46, p. 8., 13 August 
1940; OSS Washington Registry SI Intel Field Files, Record Group 226, Entry 17. National Archives and 
Record Administration, College Park, MD. 
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its defense and that guarantees the Allies would purchase Turkey’s agricultural goods.  
This was absolutely critical to the Turkish negotiators since 80 to 90 percent of Turkish 
exports were agricultural and exports in 1934 had fallen sixty percent from their 1929 
levels, “from £T155 million to £T92 million.”75
Viewed from Ankara, the German-Italian “Pact of Steel” signed in May, 1939 and 
the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR of August 1939, the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, tied two of Turkey’s most-worrisome regional neighbors to 
Europe’s most resurgent military giant, Germany.  In economics terms, the combined  
Gross Domestic Product in 1990 dollars of these three countries in 1938 amounted to  
 
Figure 5 
 
$851 billion while the combined GDP of France and the UK was little more than half of 
that, or $470 billion. (Figures 4 and 5)76
                                                 
75 Deringil, p. 17. 
 Should the Axis trio decide to turn its sights on 
Turkey, Turkish military assessments must have been rather bleak on the Anglo-French 
capability to come to Turkey’s aid. 
76 Ralph Zuljan, “Allied and Axis GDP,” internet website, http://www.onwar.com/articles/0302.htm. Zuljan 
notes that he took the data from Mark Harrison, ed. The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in 
International Comparison (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998), p. 10. 
Wartime GDP of the Great Powers 
1938 to 1945 in International Dollars and 1990 Prices (billions)* 
Country 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
USA 800 869 943 1094 1235 1399 1499 1474 
UK 284 287 316 344 353 361 346 331 
France 186 199 164 130 116 110 93 101 
Italy 141 151 147 144 145 137 117 92 
USSR 359 366 417 359 274 305 362 343 
Germany 351 384 387 412 417 426 437 310 
Austria 24 27 27 29 27 28 29 12 
Japan 169 184 192 196 197 194 189 144 
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It is therefore not surprising that even while Turkey sought out an alliance with 
the British and the French, the country simultaneously tried to stay on the best possible 
terms it could with Germany.  Only one month after the previously mentioned subsidiary 
agreement between Britain and Turkey, Turkish diplomats “presented a list of commodity 
requirements to the British which they wanted before they would consider cessation of 
trade with Germany.” Weisband continues, “At the same time, they made similar 
demands on the Germans, emphasizing their need for trucks, spare parts, guns, plant 
facilities, locomotives, and railway materials.”77
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  As Britain and France sought to bolster 
the defenses of their home territory, Germany was the only state from which Turkey 
could hope to receive substantial amounts of arms.   
 
 
Figure 678
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 Germany’s spring campaign of 1940 involved a two-month battle with Britain 
over access to Sweden’s iron ore; Turkish leaders surely took note of what could happen 
to them if they chose too firm a stance against exporting their strategic mineral, chromite, 
to Germany.  In these battles Germany also rolled right over both Norway and Denmark.  
On May 10, 1940, Germany turned westward and launched a massive invasion of France.  
One seemingly powerful leg of the Tri-Partite Agreement had fallen with hardly a fight.  
Again, it should not come as a surprise that Turkey quickly wrapped up its negotiations 
with Germany over a new commercial agreement on July 25, 1940.  According to the 
agreement, Germany would deliver 39 locomotives, equipment, pharmaceuticals, and 
various other supplies and Turkey would export to Germany a “full variety of farm 
commodities, including mohair and olive oil.”79  Weisband also notes that these items 
were “high on the list of strategic materials which the British were trying to prevent the 
Germans from receiving.80
 The German invasion of France had deep and long-lasting repercussions for 
Turkish-American relations that few people could have guessed at that time.  Turkish-
American relations before the Second World War were important to both countries but it 
could hardly be said that the two countries enjoyed a strategic relationship.  The United 
  But with France now out of the picture, the UK busily 
building up its defenses for an expected amphibious invasion of the Isles, and the US 
refusing to export even trucks and chemicals, Turkey was growing ever more isolated on 
the southeastern flank of a Germany-dominated central Europe.    
  
3.2 The Beginnings of a Strategic Relationship 
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States, put simply, was not a major player in European affairs before the Second World 
War.  On all of the important diplomatic issues facing Turkey from the foundation of the 
modern republic until the war, such as the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, the 
Montreaux Convention on the Straits, and the various defense, friendship, cooperation, 
and even trade agreements that Turkey negotiated with the major players of Europe, 
American policy tended to be a page borrowed from the British book, and when US 
interests diverged from British interests, the US nonetheless tended to play along the 
sidelines while the major powers of Europe dominated the center of the field.  
Just one example is enough to illustrate the point: the US Ambassador to Great 
Britain in 1923, George Harvey, requested a meeting Lord Curzon, the chair of the 
Lausanne Conference for the renegotiation of the Treaty of Sèvres.  In the course of this 
conversation Curzon encouraged the United States to assume a more prominent role in 
the negotiations.  Ambassador Harvey wrote, “He [Curzon] earnestly hoped that in the 
coming [Lausanne] conference our Government would take as active a part as might be 
possible under our traditional policy of detachment from purely European affairs.”81
 With the advantage of hindsight it is now possible to see some of the earliest signs 
of greater American involvement in Turkey, and ironically they came about almost by 
accident.  Within only weeks of the German invasion of France, discussions began in 
  The 
active role that Curzon hoped for did not come about; after the negotiations, however, the 
US abided by the agreement and also negotiated its own side agreement with the 
government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 
                                                 
81 FRUS, 1923, vol. 2. US Ambassador to Great Britain George Harvey to Secretary of State Charles Evans 
Hughes, Washington, DC, 1938, p. 881. 
FRUS, 1934, vol. 2, US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Skinner to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
“Proposals for Improving Unsatisfactory Trade Relations with Turkey,” Washington, DC, 1951, pp. 940-
942. 
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London about what would happen to the French portion of the chromite treaty.  British 
diplomats told the American Ambassador, Joseph Kennedy, that they were concerned 
Turkey would continue to sell its chromite to German-controlled France.  The British 
therefore proposed a plan to keep Turkish chromite out of German hands; the United 
States would assume the French 4/15’s of the treaty.   
 While the United States still had no intention of joining the war, planning was 
underway in Washington to make sure that US industries had adequate supplies of vital 
minerals and materials for an increasingly unpredictable and unstable world marketplace.  
The United States, like Germany, had almost no domestic supply of chromite (Germany 
had none) and therefore had to import the ore.  In the 1920s the US imported chromite 
almost exclusively from South Africa and Rhodesia (modern-day Zimbabwe) but in the 
1930s it began to diversify its imports.  For example, the US began buying chromite from 
Turkey in 1932.  However, by the end of the 1930s the United States was again 
dependent upon only a few sources: Southern Africa, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands.  
Cuba’s close proximity to the United States made it a fairly secure source but Southern 
Africa and the Philippines were both problematic.  If war were to break out, merchant 
ships would have to travel extensive distances through dangerous waters.  For this reason 
the United States began stockpiling chromite and other minerals in 1939.82
                                                 
82 H.D. Keiser, Ed., US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook: Review of 1940. 
<
  Figure 7 
shows the fluctuations of chromite imports to the US throughout the 1920s and ‘30s. 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/usbmmyb.html> (15 May 2008), p. 585.  See also Arthur Kemp, 
“Chromium: A Strategic Material.” Harvard Business Review (Winter 1942), p. 210. 
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Figure 783
The strategic nature of chromite was emphasized during 1940.  Germany acquired 
the smelting facilities of France and Norway and a considerable stock of 
chromite, but no producing area was occupied.  Despite these acquisitions, it is 
believed that the Axis Powers were short of the valuable raw material.  England, 
on the other hand, bought the entire Turkish output, contracted for a substantial 
 
When the UK approached the United States about picking up the French 4/15s 
share of the Anglo-French-Turkish commercial agreement, the US expressed interest.  
British and American motives do not appear to be the same, however.  The US motive at 
this point appears to be building up its strategic reserve.  The UK, however, had adequate 
supplies of chromite from its southern African colonies but according to at least one 
report, British planners were already in 1940 doing everything they could to prevent 
chromite from reaching Germany from Turkey or any other source.  According to the 
first confidential Minerals Yearbook published by the US Department of the Interior’s 
Bureau of Mines: 
                                                 
83 This graph was made from data in the Minerals Yearbook: Review of 1940, p. 587. 
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tonnage of Greek ore, and deflected much of the Yugoslav output to friendly 
channels.  These achievements plus dominance of the seas gave England virtual 
control of chromite supplies.84
On June 22, 1940 the United States Ambassador in London wrote to Washington 
to ask whether the US government was interested in pursuing the issue of assuming the 
French obligations.  Washington’s initial position was one of interest but with two 
reservations.  One, the US was not interested in paying a dramatically inflated price and 
secondly, the government wanted either British or Turkish ships to carry the ore.  In 
terms of price, the Procurement Division of the US Treasury remained angry about 
paying what it considered “an unreasonable price” on a previous chromite purchase from 
Turkey. 
 
 
85
Treasury therefore overruled the State Department’s desire to purchase additional 
large sums of chromite from Turkey.  Their primary argument was that Turkey’s asking 
price was unreasonably higher than the going rate of Rhodesian ore; this rationale made 
sense according to a policy that sought to get the most ore per dollar regardless of its 
origins.  In other words, the Treasury Department was not particularly concerned about 
denying ore to Germany but acquiring it for the US.  Within a month the naysayers at 
Treasury were themselves overruled, however, apparently by someone higher up the 
bureaucratic shuffle in the Defense Department who understood the strategic import of 
Turkish ore.  Secretary of State Hull wrote on 21 September 1940 to Ambassador 
  As the months went by and the US dithered on the details, the British decided 
to go ahead and pick up the French portion of the agreement themselves; not only that but 
to the surprise of American diplomats, Turkey negotiated a price for the chromite that 
was far above the price with which the US Treasury Department was already unhappy. 
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MacMurray, “After exploring other possible sources of supply, the Defense Commission 
and Procurement Division are now convinced of the desirability of procuring Turkish 
chrome [sic]86 as soon as possible.”87
[T]he United States, as a very exceptional measure, has recently permitted the 
exportation to Turkey of tetraethyl lead essential for aviation fuel.  This 
permission was granted contrary to the firmly established policy of this 
Government and was made possible only as a result of the unusually friendly 
relations between the United States and Turkey.
   
Since British purchases of Turkish chromite were strategic and not based on 
domestic consumption needs, the British were happy to have the United States pick up 
the tab for Turkish chromite and therefore encouraged the US to take over some or all of 
the British commitment.  However, the British were contractually bound not to resell 
Turkish chromite without the express permission of the Turkish government.  Secretary 
Hull suggested that if the Turkish negotiators hesitated, the Ambassador should remind 
the Turkish authorities that: 
88
 Turkey did not resist changing the terms of the commercial agreement and readily 
allowed chromite promised to Britain to be sent to the United States instead.  The Turkish 
Ambassador agreed with Secretary Hull that Turkish cooperation was in part a quid pro 
quo for the US agreement of sales to Turkey of tetraethyl lead.
  
 
89  The US received formal 
Turkish approval to purchase the chromite on October 9, 1940.90
                                                 
86 The US purchased chromite ore from Turkey and not the pigment chrome. 
87 FRUS, 1940, vol. 3, Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Ambassador in Turkey, J.V.A MacMurray, 
Washington, DC, 1958, p. 951. 
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 In mid 1941 the US government began implementing strict inventory controls on 
chromite to prevent hoarding by private firms and individuals so that key war-time 
industries would not suffer shortages.  This ruling “required suppliers and their 
customers…to file a sworn statement of compliance…and also required customers to file 
monthly (emphasis in original) statements of compliance with their suppliers.”91  An 
article in the New York Times outlined concerns from both the steel industry and the 
government that the US could run low on chromite, given the country’s seemingly 
insatiable appetite for chromite—it consumed between 750,000 and 800,000 long tons in 
1940—and the fact that nearly all of it was imported.92
 Turkish leaders meanwhile were growing ever more concerned about the rapid 
advance of German troops through southeastern Europe.  The German invasion of 
Romania on October 7, 1940 and the Italian entry into the war with the invasion of 
Greece from Albania three weeks later on October 28 heightened concern considerably in 
Ankara and at the Turkish diplomatic mission in Washington.
  The government also warned the 
industry that if these measures did not work the government would be forced to 
implement more draconian regulations.   
93  On October 9 the 
Turkish Ambassador to the United States requested a meeting with the State Department 
in order to put forward a rather peculiar idea.  He proposed the addition of the United 
States to a bloc of states to resist further German aggression.  In addition to the US and 
Turkey the bloc would include Russia, Bulgaria, and possibly Greece.94
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  Ambassador 
Ertegün noted that this was his personal idea and not the formal suggestion of his country 
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and so Undersecretary of State Berle (pronounced bur lee) told him that while he was 
generally sympathetic to the idea, he did not think it would be a possible for the United 
States to join together with Russia because there were just too many fundamental issues 
on which the two countries did not agree, not least of which was Russia’s “assertion of 
the right to take and seize territory by violence, as she had done in Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia…”95
It was at about this time that a central question arose that would remain at the 
heart of Turkish foreign policy until the end of the war and beyond.  The question is 
probably best put this way: When and under what conditions, if at all, should Turkey join 
the war?  British, Turkish, American, and Soviet interpretation of the Tri-Partite 
Agreement Turkey had signed with France and Britain all differed substantially and 
historians continue to argue today whether or not the Allied powers really wanted Turkey 
to join the war.  The historical record is awesomely mixed.  One thing is clear, Allied 
political and military leaders were never entirely unified about the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of Turkish entry into the war and the Allies therefore failed to give a 
clear, consistent, and unified stance.  Another important point to bear in mind is that as 
conditions changed, Allied and Turkish positions also changed dramatically.  Winston 
Churchill might put pressure on Turkey to join the war one day only for his Foreign 
  Ultimately, nothing came of the proposition aside from the reassurance 
derived from both sides that the two countries stood on similar footing in terms of their 
concern about German aggression. 
 
3.3 To Join or Not to Join 
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Minister, Anthony Eden, to argue not long after that Turkish entry might be more of a 
liability than an asset to the Allied cause.  After the American entry into the war 
President Roosevelt’s weak understanding of the military situation allowed him to be 
easily influenced by Churchill on one of his more hawkish days only for America’s top 
military brass to quickly overrule the idea.  When German troops were pounding their 
way into the Soviet Union and Stalin was screaming for the US and UK to open a second 
front against Germany in the West, the USSR also briefly argued in favor of a Turkish 
front in the Balkans only to later back away from its pressure on Turkey to join the war. 
 These ever-shifting positions among the Allied powers have led to a variety of 
interpretations by modern historians.  Perhaps the most extreme position is that taken by 
Frank Weber in his book The Evasive Neutral.  Weber does not waste time getting to his 
thesis; in the first sentence of the preface he writes: 
The foreign policy of Turkey during the Second World War ought to have been 
determined by the alliance treaty the Turkish government signed with the British 
and the French in the autumn of 1939.  Instead the Turks did not live up to their 
pledge and followed an unforeseen course perplexing and infuriating to their 
allies…Britain and later the United States scored Turkish diplomacy as one of 
unremitting bad faith.96
If Weber’s interpretation seems harsh that is because it is, and, frankly, an 
inappropriately biased interpretation of the historical record.  Weber is correct that the 
British were sometimes frustrated by Turkish diplomacy and sometimes considered 
Turkish policy one of bad faith, but by passing over the many instances when various 
British, and particularly American heads of state, diplomats, and generals agreed with 
their Turkish counterparts that Turkey was better off remaining neutral than joining the 
war as an active belligerent, Weber provides an overly one-sided and unfair account.   
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A year before the US even joined the war, in October of 1941, the acting Chief of 
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs made this prescient observation:  
I do not believe we or the British are going to be able to induce Russians, Turks, 
Iraqis or anyone else to fight the Axis unless they can see what they are going to 
get out of it.  In the case of the Turks, the motive would be protection of their 
hard-won independence.  The question is, do we have anything to offer any of 
these people which might be a definite inducement?  So far as Turkey is 
concerned, we have given her rather special facilities in obtaining certain military 
supplies and we should continue to do so.97
I have gathered the impression that the British diplomatic and military authorities 
here alike feel that their Government is trying to hustle the Turks faster than their 
temperamental and technological situations would justify and are inclined to 
advise the British Government that it would be wiser not to arouse in them a 
feeling of resistance but to rely rather upon their response to their impulses of 
self-interest and their sense of loyalty which in spite of their wariness and 
shrewdness in minor matters can be counted on to keep them faithful to the 
alliance and assure their eventual cooperation to the fullest extent of their 
potentialities.
  
 
Another example comes from the American Ambassador in 1941.  He wrote: 
 
98
 Many other illustrative examples also exist, including many instances where the 
British Foreign Secretary expressed various different reasons why it would be better for 
British interests for Turkey not to enter the war or provoke an attack from Germany or 
Italy.
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  Allied reasons for either not wanting Turkish participation, worrying about the 
dangers of Turkish participation, or wanting Turkish participation but understanding 
Turkish refusals to participate, varied throughout the war, but the issue of Turkish 
unpreparedness was the most important factor.  On February 20, 1941 Eden noted in his 
journal,  
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Much discussion about Turkish position.  [Gen. James] Marshall-Cornwall and 
[Air Vice-Marshal T.W.] Elmhirst [both of whom had recently been to Turkey as 
members of a mission for staff talks] gave doleful account of state of Turkish 
readiness…All this led Wavell to take the view, which Dill did not share, that 
Turks would be more of a liability than an asset at present time.100
 Given Turkey’s lack of a sufficient air force to defend against Axis air attacks—
which would have devastated Istanbul and Turkey’s nascent industry, almost all of which 
was concentrated in the Northwestern corner of the state—British military strategists 
knew that they would have to bolster Turkey’s air defenses in order for the Turkish 
military to even have a chance.  However, Britain was constantly plagued by a lack of 
sufficient air power to defend its primary interests in the Mediterranean, particularly 
Egypt and the Suez Canal.  Eden telegrammed Churchill on February 21, 1941, “Gravest 
anxiety is not in respect of army but of air…My own impression is that all his squadrons 
here [Cairo] are not quite up to standard…the supply of modern aircraft still leaves much 
to be desired.”
 
 
101  On May 19, 1941 Eden wrote a private message to Churchill that is a 
direct repudiation of Weber’s thesis, stating “So far, Turkey has held fast to the Anglo-
Turkish Alliance and, for the present at least, appears to wish to continue to do so.”102
Few things have concentrated minds in the United States and Britain in the 20th 
century like policies emanating from Russia.  When the Soviet Union began expressing 
interest in Turkey opening a Balkan front against Germany in August of 1943, Turkey 
quickly grew suspicious of Soviet motives.  While this was the first “open” request made 
by the Soviet Union, the Soviets had tried to push Turkey into the war earlier by 
instigating a diplomatic crisis.  In the winter of 1942 the KGB arranged for the 
assassination of the German Ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen in order to divert 
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German forces away from the Soviet Union.  The assassination attempt failed and 
Turkish security forces quickly linked Moscow to the attack, thereby scuttling the 
scheme.103
Turkey resisted British/Soviet pressure by repeating the country was not prepared 
to go to war.  The British therefore proposed the construction of British air bases but 
Turkey refused these, too, because it feared Germany would use them as a casus belli.  
Frankly, the British could not give Turkey the military resources that were necessary for 
Turkey to defend itself and the United States was uninterested in a Balkan front.  General 
George C. Marshall and the American military establishment considered a Balkan front a 
terrible idea for they would “burn up our logistics right down the line.”
  
104
The Allied countries thus repeated this circular argument with Turkey throughout 
the war.  Churchill in particular took the view that Turkey should enter the war but it is 
probably inappropriate to focus too much on his prodding because Turkey also knew that 
the United States did not favor a Balkan front and was also well aware of the deep 
reservations Churchill’s military staff maintained about Turkish entry and a Balkan front.  
To further illustrate the point, US Admiral Leahy notes a very intriguing remark made by 
President Franklin Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill during a quadripartite dinner 
between the US, UK, Turkey, and the USSR during the Second Cairo Conference in 
December 1943.  Roosevelt said to Churchill “that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he 
would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning 
neutrality and leading his nation to war.”
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 Britain’s Ambassador to Turkey puts what may be the final nail in the Weber 
thesis when he concludes in his memoirs:  
Turkey owes much to Ismet İnonü.  To the General who played so great a role in her War 
of Independence and whose name perpetuates his great victory, to the diplomat who 
negotiated at Mudania, to the Prime Minister responsible for so much of the Republic’s 
early days and to the President who took over when Ataturk died, saw her through the 
war period and still guides her as she develops her political system.  A man of highest 
principles and honour and a true friend of ours.106
 Returning to the somewhat chronological narrative, the ink was barely dry on the 
Anglo-Turkish-French commercial agreement when Turkey signed a commercial 
agreement with Germany on July 25, 1940.  In keeping with its position of neutrality, 
however, this was perfectly within Turkey’s rights as a neutral state and did not violate 
the Tripartite agreement.  Under that agreement Turkey was committed to sell all its 
 
 
If the American President, top American diplomats, Foreign Secretary Eden, and 
Britain’s chief diplomat to Turkey did not conclude Turkey’s policies were one of 
“unremitting bad faith,” then who, exactly, is Weber talking about?  Even if one grants 
that diplomats tend to brush over difficulties, especially in memoirs, Hugessen’s 
conclusions about İnonü and Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War are 
quite representative of diplomatic correspondence at the time.  Furthermore, the frank and 
sincere discussions Turkish, British, and American leaders shared throughout the war 
helped pave the way for close collaboration after the war and Turkey’s entrance into 
NATO in 1952.   
 
3.4 The Resumption of Turkish-German Trade 
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chromite stocks to Britain until the end of 1942.  To the distinct consternation of the 
Germans, Turkey abided by this agreement to the end. 
 In 1941 as German forces conquered ever more territory and countries in the 
Balkans, von Papen tightened the screws on Turkey diplomatically.  By June the Axis 
powers bordered the country on four sides.  From the northwest Germany was but a short 
distance from Istanbul in Thrace, from the west the Italians occupied the Dodecanese 
Islands, from the northeast the USSR lay waiting in the Caucasus, and Vichy Syria and 
Iraq sat in the south and southeast (though both of those countries would return to Allied 
control in the summer of 1941).   
 It was at the height of German power in the Balkans and prior to beginning of 
Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, that Germany decided to 
send Dr. Karl Clodius, the country’s chief trade negotiator, to Turkey to hammer out a 
new commercial agreement.  In spite of the commercial agreement signed a year before 
in 1940, Turkish-German trade had not picked up appreciably.  Whereas Turkish exports 
to Germany accounted for 51 percent of the country’s imports and 31 percent of its 
exports before the war, “these percentages were reduced to 12 percent and 9 percent 
respectively in 1940.”107
The German government instructed Dr. Clodius that its top priority was to resume 
importation of Turkish chromite.  Germany wagered its menacing position on Turkey’s 
border could pressure Turkey into breaking its commitment to Britain.  According to a 
report in the New York Times, Ambassador von Papen wanted an immediate, “token 
shipment” of 2,500 tons of chromite from Turkey as a demonstration of Turkish 
   Trade did not increase largely because of German delays in 
delivering goods to Turkey. 
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goodwill.108  Germany also requested 150,000 tons of chromite in 1943 and 1944 each, or 
about 50 percent of Turkey’s output.  Turkey, as the New York Times article put it, “beat 
down [the] demand.”  Turkey’s chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Numan 
Menemencioğlu, had some requests of his own.  Given German promises but failure to 
deliver needed supplies under the previous year’s commercial agreement, 
Menemencioğlu tied Turkish chromite exports to German delivery of goods.  In the end 
Turkey agreed to ship 45,000 tons of chromite to Germany between January 15, 1943 and 
March 1, 1943. “If Germany delivered 18 million Turkish liras worth of military 
equipment, Turkey would send an additional 45,000 tons of chromite to Germany in 
1943, and 90,000 tons during 1944.”109  As a result of this agreement, Turkey’s trade 
with Germany picked back up in 1942, accounting for 28 percent of Turkey’s imports 
and 25 percent of its total exports.110
The Turks send chrome to Germany under an agreement signed with CLODIUS 
in the Autumn of 1942, after an Allied official in Ankara had neglected—despite 
official Turkish notification—to apply for renewal of the Allied contract with the 
Turks, which up to the end of 1942 gave the British and Americans the entire 
Turkish chrome output.  The negligence of this official (who has been removed) 
gave CLODIUS an opening and he drove a bargain for chrome in exchange for 
German armaments.
 
Why and how Britain and the United States failed to secure a lock on Turkish 
chromite exports by extending the British commercial agreement remains an open 
question inadequately answered by the historical record.  One utterly startling intelligence 
report, however, chalks it up to a bureaucratic blunder!   
111
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The agreement was initially hailed in the American press as a failure of German 
diplomacy and a victory for the Turks.112
 Political and battlefield developments in 1941 began to change the calculus for 
Turkey.  German pressure would gradually decrease while Allied pressure for active 
Turkish participation and a cessation of trade relations with Germany gradually 
increased.  The greatest single change in pressure on Turkey came about as a result of the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union.  One explanation for Germany’s turn on the Soviet 
Union—Hitler’s plans in Mein Kampf aside—was the hard-bargaining by Soviet Prime 
Minister Molotov.  German-Soviet negotiations in late 1940 show German-Soviet 
divergence over Turkey, the vital Straits, and access to Britain’s holdings in the Middle 
East.  Molotov told Ribbentrop and Hitler that the USSR viewed control of the Turkish 
straits as essential to its security and, according to Hale, Molotov said “he could reach an 
agreement with Turkey on this.”
  The British and American governments were 
not nearly as generous.  For them the new Turco-German agreement was an utter failure 
in their attempt to prevent Germany from receiving vital materials.  The US, in addition 
to its interest in stockpiling chromite and other vital materials, grew increasingly 
concerned about Axis aggression throughout 1940.  In recognition of the Axis threat, the 
US progressively reversed its policies against exporting arms.  In 1941 it began supplying 
Britain (and later the Soviet Union) with Lend-Lease aid, including tanks, howitzers, 
rifles, ammunition, and a wide variety of other material.  A fair amount of this material 
also made it to Turkey via the UK. 
113
                                                 
112 Ray Brock, “German Threats to Turks Detailed,” New York Times, October 11, 1941, p. 2. 
113 Hale, p. 85. 
  Germany responded with a draft agreement with the 
aim of drawing Turkey away from Great Britain, “‘to recognize the extent of Turkey’s 
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possessions,’ and to secure a revision of the Montreux Convention giving the Soviet 
Union free naval access through the straits.”114  This was not enough for Molotov, 
however, and he responded that the USSR must have naval and military bases on the 
Turkish straits.  If Turkey agreed to join the Axis powers, then they would guarantee 
Turkey’s integrity, but if not then “‘the required military and diplomatic measures’ would 
be taken.”115  If this were not enough, Molotov also said Bulgaria would be forced to sign 
a mutual assistance pact with the USSR since, Molotov claimed, Bulgaria lay within the 
USSR’s Black Sea “security zone.”  Hitler promptly informed the Turkish Ambassador to 
Berlin, Hüsrev Gerede, of Molotov’s conversation.116
The German invasion of Russia relieved an enormous amount of pressure on 
Turkey.  As von Papen himself noted in a cable to Berlin, “Turkey is in transports of 
joy.”
  The negotiations ended without an 
agreement and only twenty-two days later Hitler ordered his generals to start making 
plans for Operation Barbarossa. 
117
While German battlefield setbacks meant less compulsion on Turkey from 
Germany, Allied successes, on the other hand, meant increasing pressure from Britain 
and now America for Turkey to cease its trade with Germany.  The United States and the 
United Kingdom renewed the process of pressuring Turkey to cease its chromite and 
  America’s entry into the war at the end of 1941 also greatly strengthened the 
Allies’ potential.  German setbacks and then losses in Russia in 1942 lessened the 
pressure on Turkey to supply German chromite, though trade with Germany in fact 
picked up substantially. 
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other trade with Germany by setting up preemptive purchasing programs in Turkey, 
similar to programs implemented in Spain, Portugal (tungsten), and various other 
countries to deny Germany material critical to its war machine.  These programs sought 
to buy up as much of the most strategic minerals as possible in order to deprive Germany 
of needed material and to thereby shorten the length of the war. 
American intelligence well understood just how vital chromite supplies were to 
Germany, and that in spite of the Clodius agreement Germany was growing desperately 
short of supplies.  A Military Intelligence Report of 5 April 1944 reads:  
Information gathered from several independent sources checked very closely and 
all were completely agreed upon conclusions that continued supplies of chrome 
was [sic] absolutely vital and that disappearance of those supplies would result in 
a shutdown of Germany’s ferro-alloy steel mills.  That means according to experts 
here that Germany’s ferro-alloy, particularly chrome, position is the sorest point 
in her entire war production situation, overshadowing her pressing manpower and 
food problems.118
German battlefield losses turned into an avalanche of further problems for its steel 
industry.  Germany lost its access to manganese, another important element used in 
similar ways as chromite, when the Soviets recaptured the Nikopol mines in 1944 and 
were forced to reduce their expectations from Greek mines as a result of guerrilla 
sabotage.
  
 
119
     Hence the element in shortest supply is chromium.  This is especially grave 
since chromium is indispensable to a highly developed armaments industry.  
 
Captured German documents after the war confirmed American and British 
intelligence estimates during the war.  The German Minister for Armaments, Albert 
Speer, reported to Hitler: 
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Should supplies from Turkey be cut off, the stockpile of chromium is sufficient 
only for 5-6 months [emphasis added].  The manufacture of planes, tanks, motor 
vehicles, tank shells, U-boats, and almost the entire gamut of artillery would have 
to cease from one to three months after this deadline, since by then the reserve in 
the distribution channels would be used up.120
Speer “explained further that the conclusion in his memorandum ‘meant no more or less 
than that the war would be over approximately ten months after the loss of the 
Balkans.’”
 
 
121
 By the spring of 1944 the tide had turned dramatically in the Allies favor and the 
Axis powers were facing dramatic losses on all sides.  Nonetheless, Turkey continued to 
carry out a brisk trade with Germany as per the Clodius agreement.  In fact, Edward 
Weisband declares the American preemptive purchasing program a failure.  Just as 
Turkey diligently stuck to its agreement to sell all of its chromite to Britain until the last 
day of its agreement with Britain, December, 1942, so too did Turkey adhere to its 
commitments to sell chromite to Germany in 1943 and 1944.  An American Foreign 
Economic Administration report dated May 1, 1944 agreed that American preemptive 
purchases of chromite failed.  “On the other hand, efforts to prevent enemy imports of the 
three Turkish commodities most vital to the enemy, chrome, copper, and the tanning 
materials, valonia and valex, were not very successful.”
 
122
The changing course of the war, however, saw increasing pressure on Turkey to 
cut off its trade with Germany entirely, chromite and all.  These desires were met with 
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resistance until finally, on April 14, 1944, the United States and Britain vented their 
frustration with Turkey’s continued trade with this strongly worded warning: 
     The Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain 
have been seriously perturbed by the economic assistance which Turkish trade 
relations with Europe have given to the enemy.  Hitherto however they have 
acquiesced in this situation on the informal understanding that Turkish exports 
were limited to what was required to purchase essential Turkish requirements 
which could not be obtained from the United Nations [i.e. Allies].  The rapidly 
approaching crisis in the war situation, when it is essential that the enemy should 
be deprived of all means of resistance, compels the two Governments to revise 
their attitude even though they realize that this may cause some temporary 
inconvenience to [sic] Turkish economy.  Accordingly they feel bound to warn 
the Turkish Government that the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Great Britain view with serious disfavor as prejudicial to their 
vital interests the Turkish agreements with Germany and her satellites whereby 
Turkey undertakes to supply commodities to those countries which are essential 
to the conduct of the war.  Any renewal of agreements or the conclusion of fresh 
agreements on the same lines will entail the application to Turkey of blockade 
measures such as the two Governments have throughout the war applied to neutral 
countries.123
Reason for this was the reading by the President of an article in The Financial 
Times in which the writer states that in Turkey the President no longer plays any 
significant part in public affairs; that a certain group believe that ‘they have the 
 
 
Following the presentation of the joint US/UK note, a secret and stormy session 
of the Turkish Parliament ensued.  According to an American Military Intelligence 
Report, whose quoted source was a “former Turkish government official,” the Turkish 
Parliament led the charge in reversing Turkish policy and cutting off trade with Germany.  
The source reported that Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu informed both the US and 
British Ambassador that Turkey intended to immediately cut trade to Germany by 60%.  
However, only a short time later President İnonü announced that Turkey would cease 
trade with Germany entirely.  The source continued: 
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government in their hands.’  On reading this, the President apparently felt it time 
to show he was still influential in national and international affairs.124
The Turkish Minister of Communications recently told the British Military 
Attaché that he had been approached by the German Ambassador on the matter of 
returning the rolling stock now that chrome shipments to Germany had been 
suspended.  The Minister of Communications said that he told Von Papen that this 
rolling-stock was scattered throughout the country, that it would take at least two 
months to assemble it, and that in any case he considered it very unwise for the 
Germans to attempt to recover these locomotives and cars at this time in view of 
the danger of their loss by Allied air-attacks in Bulgaria.  He assured the British 
Military Attaché that even if the Germans did insist on the return of the rolling 
stock, he would manage to put so many obstructions and difficulties in the way as 
to virtually prevent their delivery.
 
 
 German efforts to restore the 19 locomotives and several hundred railway cars 
that the country had loaned Turkey for use to deliver chromite to Germany provides a 
comical bookend to this story of minerals and war.  A Navy Intelligence report discussed 
this in June, 1944: 
125
 Turkey’s trade, particularly in strategically important materials like chromite, 
followed an up and down pattern that followed the changing fortunes of the countries in 
the war.  Turkey successfully leveraged its valuable resources to maintain its 
independence, establish alliances and agreements when necessary, but also abrogate them 
when circumstances dictated.  The fact that Turkey never joined the war until a very late 
date in 1945, when the war was essentially over, saved Turkey substantial resources and 
the devastating impact of war.  In addition to the human toll a war would have caused to 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Further Conclusions 
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Turkey, one scarcely wants to think what Istanbul would look like today had the German 
Luftwaffe done its damage to the city. 
 As was argued in the first chapter, chromite was one of the most important levers 
available to Turkish statesmen in their efforts to satisfy, or at least appease, the various 
foreign powers that sought relationships with Turkey.  Declassified government 
documents from intelligence and diplomatic records, together with contemporary 
evidence, support this case.  The first chapter also showed that Turkey had little interest 
in making major revisions to its borders through participation in armed conflict.  
Turkey’s economic and political situation in the 1930s was precarious and given the 
nascent Turkish government’s military success in securing Anatolia, followed by the 
diplomatic success at the Lausanne Conference, Turkey became a status quo power.  This 
generally made Turkey more sympathetic to the Allied cause in the war—as opposed to 
German and Italian revisionist tendencies.  However, Turkey’s precarious situation on the 
edge of German occupied territory in the war, combined with the state’s inferior ability to 
wage war made the only reasonable policy one of “active neutrality.”  In the final chapter 
it was shown that even though Turkish statesmen feared Soviet influence in Eastern 
Europe, Turkey’s economic and military condition did not allow it to seriously consider 
joining an active part in the war to counterbalance the Soviet Union on Turkey’s 
doorstep.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
  
 
The National Pact (Misak-i Millî) 
 
1. The territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority (united in religion, race 
and aim) formed an indivisible whole, but the fate of the territories inhabited by 
an Arab majority that were under foreign occupation should be determined by 
plebiscite. 
2. A plebiscite could determine the fate of the ‘three vilayets’ of Batum, Kars and 
Ardahan, which were Russian from 1878 to 1918. 
3. The same should hold true for the fate of western Thrace. 
4. The security of the capital, Istanbul, and of the Sea of Marmara must be assured.  
The opening of the Straits to commercial shipping would be a subject for 
discussion with other interested countries. 
5. The rights of minorities would be established in conformity with the treaties 
concluded between the Entente and European states. 
6. The economic, financial and judicial independence of the empire should be 
assured and free from restrictions (in other words, a return of the capitulations 
would be unacceptable). 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, FRANCE AND TURKEY 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Angora, October 19th, 1939, and Two Protocols 
annexed thereto of the same Date. 
 
French official text communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French 
Republic. The registration took place February 17th, 1940. 
 
Special Agreement, signed at Angora, October 19th, 1939, and Subsidiary Arrangements, 
including: an Arrangement relating to the Credit of £25 Million Sterling at 4 per cent., 
1939, and an Arrangement relating to the Loan of £i5 Million Sterling at 3 per cent., 
1939. Signed at Paris, January 8th, 1940. 
 
French official text communicated by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
in Great Britain. The registration took place March 29th, 1940. 
 
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND TURKEY 
 
Subsidiary Agreements, including: an Agreement regarding a Loan of Two Million 
Pounds, and an Additional Agreement to the Agreement of September 2nd, 1936, 
regarding Trade and Clearing. Signed at Paris, January 8th, 1940. 
 
English official text communicated by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
in Great Britain. The registration took place March 29th, 1940. 
 
TREATY 2 OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND, FRANCE AND TURKEY. 
SIGNED AT ANGORA, OCTOBER 19TH, 1939. 
 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF 
GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE 
SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA (in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland), and THE PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC: 
 
Desiring to conclude a treaty of a reciprocal character in the interests of their national 
security, and to provide for mutual assistance in resistance to aggression, Have appointed 
as their Plenipotentiaries, namely: 
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THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: 
M. René MASSIGLI, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Commander of 
the Legion of Honour; 
His MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND THE BRITISH 
DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA (for the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): 
 
Sir Hughe Montgomery KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN, K.C.M.G., Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; 
 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC: 
 
Dr. Refik SAYDAM, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim, 
Deputy for Istanbul; 
 
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed 
as follows: 
 
Article 1. 
 
In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European Power in 
consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the United 
Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance 
in their power. 
 
Article 2. 
 
(i) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the 
Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom axe involved, Turkey will 
collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend them all aid 
and assistance in her power. 
 
(ii) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the 
Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United Kingdom will 
collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and assistance in their power. 
 
Article 3. 
 
So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom to Greece and 
Roumania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, remain in force, 
Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom and will lend 
them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of France and the United Kingdom 
being engaged in hostilities in virtue of either of the said guarantees. 
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Article 4. 
 
In the event of France and the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities with a 
European 
Power in consequence of aggression committed by that Power against either of those 
States without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being applicable, the High Contracting 
Parties will immediately consult together. 
 
It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at least a 
benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom. 
 
Article 5. 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event of either: 
 
(1) Aggression by a European Power against another European State which the 
Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval of that State, 
undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality against such aggression, 
or 
 
(2) Aggression by a European Power which, while directed against another European 
State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, a menace to its own security, the High Contracting Parties will immediately 
consult together with a view to such common action as might be considered effective. 
 
Article 6. 
 
The present Treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure France, 
the United Kingdom and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance in resistance to aggression 
should the necessity arise. 
 
Article 7. 
 
The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between 
Turkey and each of the two other High Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 8. 
 
If the High Contracting Parties are engaged in hostilities in consequence of the operation 
of the present Treaty, they will not conclude an armistice or peace except by common 
agreement. 
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Article 9. 
 
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited 
simultaneously at Angora as soon as possible. It shall enter into force on the date of this 
deposit. 
 
The present Treaty is concluded for a period of fifteen years. If none of the High 
Contracting Parties has notified the two others of its intention to terminate it six months 
before the expiration of the said period, the Treaty will be renewed by tacit consent for a 
further period of five years, and so on. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have thereto 
affixed their seals. 
 
Done at Angora, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939. 
 
(L. S.) R. MASSIGLI. 
(L. S.) H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. 
(L. S.) Dr. R. SAYDAM. 
 
 
PROTOCOL No. 1. 
 
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries state that their respective Governments agree that the 
Treaty of to-day's date shall be put into force from the moment of its signature. 
 
The present Protocol shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty concluded to-
day between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey. 
 
Done at Angora, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939. 
 
R. MASSIGLI. 
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. 
Dr. R. SAYDAM. 
 
 
PROTOCOL No. 2. 
 
At the moment of signature of the Treaty between France, the United Kingdom and 
Turkey, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have agreed as 
follows: 
 
The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot 
compel that country to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, 
entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union. 
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The present Protocol shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty concluded to-
day between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey. 
 
Done at Angora, in triplicate, the 19th October, 1939. 
 
R. MASSIGLI. 
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. 
Dr. R. SAYDAM. 
 
 
 
SPECIAL AGREEMENT. 
 
SIGNED AT ANGORA, OCTOBER 19th, 1939. 
 
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND and OF THE TURKISH 
REPUBLIC, desiring to regulate, in connection with the Treaty signed this day, certain 
questions concerning Turkey of a financial and economic nature or relative to deliveries 
of war material, have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom place at the 
disposal of Turkey a credit of £25,000,000 destined to cover the supplies of war material 
referred to in Article 2 below. 
 
In this sum are included the credit of 460,000,000 French francs and that of £10,000,000 
which the French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom have already 
declared their readiness to place at the disposal of Turkey for the same purpose. 
 
The credit referred to above shall be repaid in 20 years; it shall carry interest at 4 per 
cent. 
 
The conditions of repayment shall be the object of a subsequent arrangement; the 
elaboration of this arrangement shall not, however, delay the despatch of the material 
referred to in Article 2 below. 
 
Article 2. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom shall supply to 
Turkey, as soon as possible, the material forming the subject of the credit mentioned in 
Article 1, paragraph 2. 
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A Commission comprising qualified representatives of the three Governments shall meet 
as soon as possible in Paris or London in order to draw up the programme of deliveries 
corresponding to the surplus of the credit stipulated in Article 1. 
 
Without awaiting the completion of this programme, the Commission shall determine the 
supplies the delivery of which shall be effected as a matter of urgency. For this purpose 
the 
Commission shall have regard to the necessity of placing Turkey without delay in a 
position to offer effective resistance to an attack which might be directed at short notice 
against her European frontiers ; it shall equally have regard to the immediate possibilities 
of the French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom. 
 
Article 3. 
 
The stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 above shall not affect any arrangements which may 
be made between the three Governments in the event of their becoming engaged together 
in hostilities in execution of the Treaty signed this day, for the purpose of furnishing 
Turkey with the material which might be recognised as necessary. 
 
Article 4. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom shall grant to 
Turkey a loan of £15,000,000. The equivalent in gold of this amount shall be delivered to 
the Turkish Government at Angora by the French Government and the Government of 
the United Kingdom. 
 
This loan shall be repaid within the same period as the war material credit referred to in 
Article 1 above; it shall carry interest at the rate of 3 per cent. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom agree that the 
service and amortisation of this loan shall be effected in Turkish pounds which shall be 
utilised for the purchase of tobacco or, by agreement, of other Turkish products. 
 
Article 5. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom shall place 
respectively at the disposal of Turkey: 
 
The French Government a loan representing the equivalent in French francs at this 
present date of £1,500,000, and the Government of the United Kingdom a loan of 
£2,000,000. 
 
The Turkish Government undertake to use these sums in the first place for the transfer of 
the French commercial credits recorded this day in the Clearing Account to a maximum 
of the equivalent in French francs of £1,500,000 at this present date and of the British 
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commercial credits recorded this day in the Clearing Account to a maximum of 
£2,000,000. 
 
These loans shall be subject to the same conditions as regards interest and repayment as 
the loan referred to in Article 4. 
 
The present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty concluded 
this day between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey.  It shall enter into force at the 
same tune and in the same conditions as that Treaty. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to that effect, have 
signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. 
 
Done in triplicate at Angora, this nineteenth day of October, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-nine. 
 
(L. S.) R. MASSIGLI. 
(L. S.) H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN. 
(L. S.) Dr. R. SAYDAM. 
 
 
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS 
ARRANGEMENT RELATING TO THE CREDIT OF £25 MILLION STERLING AT 4 
PERCENT., ICSQ. 
 
SIGNED AT PARIS, JANUARY 8th, 1940. 
 
An Agreement having been entered into between THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED 
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
TURKISH REPUBLIC for the opening of a credit of £25 million sterling in favour of the 
Turkish Government designed to cover the provision of war material. 
 
The above-mentioned Governments have agreed on the following arrangements for the 
purpose of regulating the technical application of the said credit: 
 
Article 1. 
 
The credit of £25 million sterling available to the Turkish Government shall be utilised as 
follows: 
 
The French Government shall agree to the delivery to the Turkish Government of war 
material, the arrangements concerning which shall be the object of special agreements to 
be concluded between the qualified representatives of the French Government and 
Turkish Government. As and when they fall due under these agreements, the French 
77 
 
Government, in agreement with the qualified representatives of the Turkish Government, 
shall pay to the competent French Departments the sums payable under the application of 
the said arrangements. 
 
The deliveries to be made by the United Kingdom shall be effected either by way of 
release by the interested Departments or by way of sale by private firms. The manner of 
these deliveries shall be governed by a special arrangement to be concluded between the 
diplomatic representatives of the Turkish Republic in London and the Export Credits 
Guarantee Department, and by the particular contracts with each Department and each 
firm. 
 
As and when they fall due under this arrangement or these contracts, the Government of 
the United Kingdom, in accord with the qualified representatives of the Turkish 
Government, shall pay the amounts due to the interested Departments or firms by the 
intermediary of a Bank chosen by the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Turkish Government. These payments shall be made without charge or commission. 
 
The payments so made by the French Government and the Government of the United 
Kingdom for the account of the Turkish Government either by way of payments on 
account or by way of definitive payments, shaU be charged, on the date when they are 
effected, to an account held in the name of the Turkish Government in pounds sterling, 
and shall as far as interest and conditions of repayment are concerned take effect from 
that date. 
 
However, for supplies furnished in the course of the year 1939 the amounts 
corresponding to the value of these supplies shall, when they shall have been fixed in 
agreement with the qualified representatives of the Turkish Government, be charged to 
their account from the dates of delivery and shall take effect both as to interest and 
conditions of repayment as from those dates. 
 
Article 2. 
 
The Turkish Government shall arrange for the repayment of the amounts charged to their 
account in the manner laid down in Article i, as well as the payment of interest at the rate 
of 4 per cent, per annum, by means of half-yearly payments in Turkish pounds payable  
on the 3oth June and 31st December in each year starting from the 30th June, 1940, 
inclusive. These payments shall correspond with the equivalent of the sums in pounds 
sterling calculated in the following manner: 
 
1. On the 30th April, 1940, the payments made by the French Government and the 
Government of the United Kingdom on account of the Turkish Government up to that 
date shall be totalled, with the addition of accumulated interest on each payment up to 
that date. The total so obtained shall be discounted on the basis of the rate of 4 per cent, 
per annum to its present value as at the 31st December, 1939. The debt thus arrived at 
shall be repaid by the Turkish Government by means of 40 half-yearly equal payments 
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calculated on the basis of the rate of 4 per cent, per annum, the first half-yearly payment 
becoming due on the 30th June, 1940. 
 
2. On the 31st October, 1940, the payments made by the French Government and the 
Government of the United Kingdom for the account of the Turkish Government from the 
1st May, 1940, to the 31st October, 1940, shall be totalled, with the addition of the 
accumulated interest on each payment up to the 31st October, 1940. The sum so obtained 
shall be discounted on the basis of the rate of 4 per cent, per annum to its present value as 
at the 30th June, 1940.  
 
The debt thus arrived at shall be repaid by the Turkish Government by means of 40 equal 
half-yearly payments calculated on the basis of the rate of 4 per cent, per annum, the first 
of these halfyearly payments falling due on the 3ist December, 1940. 
 
3. The repayment of subsequent advances shall be effected by the same arrangements : 
each 30th April and each 31st October, as the case may be, the payments made by the 
French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom on account of the 
Turkish Government in the course of the period of six months terminating on the date in 
question, shall be totalled, with the addition of the accumulated interest on each payment 
up to that date. The total obtained shall be discounted on the basis of the rate of 4 per 
cent, per annum to its value as at the previous 3ist December or 30th June, as the case 
may be. The debt thus arrived at shall be repaid by the Turkish Government by means of 
40 equal half-yearly payments calculated on the basis of the rate of 4 per cent, per annum, 
the first half-yearly payment falling due on the 30th June or the 
3ist December, as the case may be, which follows the date on which the debt shall have 
been determined. 
 
Article 3. 
 
As each payment becomes due, the Turkish Government shall pay the equivalent in 
Turkish pounds of the sum in pounds sterling falling due to a Special Account opened in 
the name of the French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom at the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The conversion of the pounds sterling into 
Turkish pounds shall be made at the buying rate of the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey ruling on the day preceding the date on which each payment falls due. The 
payments in Turkish pounds thus effected shall constitute a full discharge for the Turkish 
Government. 
 
The balance in the Special Account aforementioned shall be utilised by the French 
Government and the Government of the United Kingdom for the purchase in Turkey of 
Turkish commodities of all kinds destined to be imported into France and the United 
Kingdom for the internal consumption of those countries.  
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Article 4. 
 
The present Arrangement shall enter into force on the date of its signature. 
 
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to that effect, have signed the 
present arrangement. 
 
Done in triplicate in Paris, the 8th January, 1940. 
 
R, H. CAMPBELL. 
Edouard DALADIER. 
M. MENEMENCIOGLU. 
 
 
ARRANGEMENT RELATING TO THE LOAN OF £15 MILLION STERLING AT 3 
PER CENT., 1939. 
 
SIGNED AT PARIS, JANUARY 8th, 1940. 
 
An Agreement having been entered into between the GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
TURKISH REPUBLIC for granting to the Turkish Government a loan of £15 million 
sterling to be delivered in gold at Angora, The above-mentioned Governments have 
agreed on the following arrangements with a view to regulating the technical application 
of the said loan: 
 
Article 1. 
 
The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom 
shall deliver to the Turkish Government at Angora as soon as possible, but, in any case, 
within a maximum period of six weeks from the date of the signature of the present 
Arrangement, the equivalent in gold of £15 million sterling, calculated at the rate quoted 
by the Bank of England, viz., 168 shillings per ounce of gold. 
 
Article 2. 
 
The Government of the Turkish Republic shall arrange for the repayment of the capital of 
the loan, as well as the payment of the interest thereon, calculated at the rate of 3 per 
cent, per annum, by means of forty half-yearly payments in Turkish pounds, each equal 
to the equivalent in pounds sterling : £501,406 los. od. payable on the 30th June and 3ist 
December of each year commencing on the 3oth June, 1940, inclusive. 
 
However, the half-yearly payment payable on the 3Oth June, 1940, shall have deducted 
from 
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it the amount of interest at 3 per cent, per annum, accumulated from the 3ist December, 
1939, to the date when the delivery of the gold as indicated in the first article shall have 
been  effectively realised. 
 
Article 3. 
 
The sums due for the service of the loan shall be calculated in Turkish pounds, the buying 
rate of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey on the day preceding the date on 
which each payment falls due being taken as the basis of conversion of pounds sterhng 
into Turkish pounds. 
 
The amounts thus calculated shall be credited at each date on which they fall due to a 
Special 
Account in Turkish pounds opened by the said Bank for the French Government and the 
Government of the United Kingdom. 
 
These payments shall be a complete discharge for the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey. 
 
Article 4. 
 
The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom shall utilise the 
Turkish pounds put to the credit of their Special Account in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the preceding Article, for the purchase of tobacco of Turkish 
origin destined for the internal consumption of France and the United Kingdom, and of 
all other commodities destined to the same use as shall be determined by common 
agreement with the Turkish Government.  
 
Article 5. 
 
The present arrangement shall come into force on the date of its signature. In witness 
whereof, the Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to that effect, have signed the present 
Arrangement. 
 
Done in triplicate in Paris, the 8th January, 1940.  
 
R. H. CAMPBELL. 
Edouard DALADIER. 
N. MENEMENCIOGLU. 
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SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN 
IRELAND AND TURKEY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING A LOAN 
OF Two MILLION POUNDS. 
 
SIGNED AT PARIS, JANUARY 8th, 1940. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, 
desiring to regulate the technical application of the loan, of £2,000,000 sterling made by 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
Government of the Turkish Republic, have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1. 
 
The Government of the United Kingdom undertake to place at the disposal of the 
Government of the Turkish Republic within fifteen days from the date of this Agreement 
the sum of £2,000,000 sterling by payment to the Bank of England for account of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
 
Article 2. 
 
The Government of the Turkish Republic shall repay the principal of the loan and shall 
pay interest thereon at 3 per cent, per annum by means of forty six-monthly instalments 
each of which shall be equivalent to £66,854 4s. od. sterling and which shall be payable 
in Turkish pounds on the 30th June and the 31st December in each year beginning on the 
30th June, 1940. It is nevertheless agreed that there shall be deducted from the instalment 
due to be paid on the 
30th June, 1940, an amount in Turkish pounds equivalent to interest at 3 per cent, per 
annum on the amount of the loan for the period between the 31st December, 1939, and 
the date of the payment to be made in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of this 
Agreement. 
 
Article 3. 
 
The loan shall be used in the first place for the transfer of United Kingdom commercial 
debts in respect of which the corresponding amount has been deposited on or before the 
19th October, 1939, in the Special Account at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
opened in  accordance with the Anglo-Turkish Trade and Clearing Agreement 1 of the 
2nd September, 1936. Such transfer shall be effected in accordance with the terms of the 
Additional Trade and Clearing Agreement signed this day at Paris between the 
Contracting Governments. 
 
The balance of the loan shall be at the free disposal of the Government of the Turkish 
Republic.  
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Article 4. 
 
The instalments referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be calculated in Turkish 
pounds on the basis of converting pounds sterling into Turkish pounds at the buying rate 
of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey on the day preceding the day on which the 
relevant instalment is due. The amount of each instalment thus calculated shall be paid 
when due to the credit of an account in Turkish pounds to be opened for this purpose by 
the said Bank in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom and payment 
thereof shall release the Government of the Turkish Republic from further liability in 
respect of the instalment to which it relates. 
 
Article 5. 
 
The Government of the United Kingdom shall use the Turkish pounds credited as 
aforesaid to the said account for the purchase of tobacco of Turkish origin intended for 
consumption within the United Kingdom and of any other such products intended for the 
same purpose as may be agreed with the Government of the Turkish Republic. 
 
Article 6. 
 
The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have signed the 
present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. 
 
Done in duplicate in Paris, in the English language, this eighth day of January, nineteen 
hundred and forty. 
A translation shall be made into the Turkish language as soon as possible, and agreed 
upon between the Contracting Governments. 
Both texts shall then be considered equally authentic for all purposes. 
 
(L. S.) R. H. CAMPBELL. 
(L. S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU. 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC ADDITIONAL TO THE 
AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 2nd, 1936, REGARDING TRADE AND CLEARING. 
 
SIGNED AT PARIS, JANUARY 8th, I94O. 
 
Whereas THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKISH 
REPUBLIC have this day made an Agreement (hereinafter called " the Loan Agreement 
") for the purpose of regulating the technical application of the loan of £2,000,000 
sterling made by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the Government of the Turkish Republic; 
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And whereas for this and other purposes the Contracting Governments are desirous of 
amending the Trade and Clearing Agreement made between them in London on the 2nd 
day of September, 1936 (hereinafter called " the Principal Agreement "), as amended by a 
supplementary Agreement made between the Contracting Governments on the 27th day 
of May, 1938 (hereinafter called " the Supplementary Agreement "), and by Exchanges of 
Notes between the 
Contracting Governments dated the 23rd day of August, 1939 3, and the 22nd day of 
November, 1939; 
 
Now, therefore, the Contracting Governments agree that the Principal Agreement, as so 
amended, be further amended in the manner hereinafter appearing: 
 
Article 1. 
 
For the purpose of transferring, subject to the discount mentioned below, United 
Kingdom commercial debts of which the corresponding amount of Turkish pounds has 
been deposited in the Special Account on or before the igth day of October, 1939, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey shall pay to the Controller of the Anglo-Turkish 
Clearing Office at such times as he may require such part of the amount of the aforesaid 
loan as may be necessary for the aforesaid transfer. The sums so paid to the Controller of 
the Anglo-Turkish Clearing Office shall be credited to sub-account A and used for the 
aforesaid transfer. The payment of the debts in respect of which deposits have been made 
as aforesaid shall be subject to a discount calculated in accordance with the table below. 
Each payment so made shall be accepted by the creditor concerned in full discharge of 
the relevant debt or debts due to him:  
 
Percentage reduction in the deposits made in the Special Account, for the months 
indicated. 
 
1937: 
January, February, March   ........... 3 
April, May, June   ........... 6 
July, August, September.   ........... 9 
October, November, December  ......... 12 
 
1938: 
January, February, March   ......... 15 
April, May, June    ......... 18 
July, August, September.   ......... 21 
October, November, December  ......... 24 
 
1939 : 
January, February, March   ......... 27 
April, May, June    ......... 30 
July, August, September.   ......... 33 
October 1-19     ......... 36 
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Article 2. 
 
The transfer of United Kingdom commercial debts of which the corresponding amount of 
Turkish pounds has been deposited in the Special Account after the igth day of October, 
1939, in favour of creditors in the United Kingdom shall be effected through sub-account 
A and such amount as may be necessary for the purpose shall be transferred from the 
Account opened under the Exchange of Notes dated the 23rd day of August, 1939 
(hereinafter called " the Blocked Account "). The payment of the debts in respect of 
which deposits have been made as aforesaid shall be subject to a discount calculated in 
accordance with the table set out below, shall be made in the chronological order of the 
deposit by the Turkish debtor in the Special Account and shall 
be accepted by the creditor in full discharge of the relevant debt or debts due to him: 
 
Per cent. 
 
1939 : October 20 - December 31    ........ 36 
1040 : January 1 - March 31   ........ 39 
On and after April 1, 1940   ........ 40 
 
Article 3. 
 
From the date of the coming into force of this Agreement: 
 
(1) (a) 80 per cent, of all sums credited to the Clearing Account in respect of Turkish 
goods exported to the United Kingdom in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 or 
Article 13 of the Principal Agreement as so amended shall be allocated to sub-account C, 
and 
 
(b) The remaining 20 per cent, of all sums so credited shall be allocated to sub-account B, 
and the provisions of the Principal Agreement as so amended shall have effect 
accordingly. 
(2) (a) The allocation to the Blocked Account of 33 Va per cent, of the amounts allocated 
to sub-account B shall cease and any balance remaining hi the Blocked Account after all 
transfers due  to be made in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of this 
Agreement have been effected, shall be transferred to sub-account B; 
 
(b) The provisions of Article 4 (2) (iii) of the Supplementary Agreement and of Article 9 
(i) (vii) of the Principal Agreement shall be abrogated, and the provisions of paragraph (i) 
of this Article shall apply to all sums credited to the Clearing Account in respect of 
Turkish raisins and figs exported to the United Kingdom. 
 
Article 4. 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles r and 2 above, a creditor in whose favour a 
deposit has been or may be made in the Special Account may by notification in writing 
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lodged with the Anglo-Turkish Clearing Office not later than the 2oth February, 1940, 
elect to transfer the deposit by the import of Turkish goods into the United Kingdom. The 
Central Bank of Turkey shall thereupon on notification from the Anglo-Turkish Clearing 
Office provide the creditor with 
Turkish pounds up to the equivalent in Turkish pounds of his debt which the creditor 
shall be free to use for the purchase of the Turkish goods specified in the attached 
Schedule for importation into the United Kingdom. The provision of such Turkish 
pounds for the use of the creditor shall constitute a full discharge for the debt in respect 
of which the deposit was made. The provisions of the Principal Agreement as so 
amended shall not apply to such imports. 
 
Article 5. 
 
The provisions of the Principal Agreement, as so amended, shall not apply to any Turkish 
goods imported into the United Kingdom which have been purchased out of any balances 
of Turkish pounds held by the Government of the United Kingdom in pursuance of any 
Agreements entered into by the Contracting Governments. 
 
Article 6. 
 
The present Additional Agreement shall enter into force on the i5th January, 1940, and 
shall remain in force for the same period as the Principal Agreement. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have signed the 
present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. 
 
Done in duplicate in Paris, in the English language, this 8th day of January, 1940. 
 
A translation shall be made into the Turkish language as soon as possible and agreed 
between the Contracting Governments. 
 
Both texts shall then be considered to be equally authentic for all purposes. 
 
(L. S.) R. H. CAMPBELL. 
(L. S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU. 
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SCHEDULE (see Article 4). 
 
1. Tobacco leaves, cut tobacco and cigarettes. 
2. Opium. 
3. Carpets, carpeting, floor rugs, floor mats and matting and kilims, wholly 
or partly of wool, mohair, silk or artificial silk. 
4. Attar of rose. 
5. Sponges (raw and manipulated). 
6. Vegetable dyestuffs, vegetable colours and colouring matters. 
7. Medicinal plants, flowers, roots and leaves. 
8. Eggs, egg-powder. 
9. Fish oil for industrial purposes. 
10. Hemp. 
 
